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Abstract 
 
European Union’s growing natural gas import dependence, high dependency on Russia’s 
gas and depletion of own intra-EU gas reserves has made EU look towards diversification 
of suppliers like Azerbaijan. Considering that nowadays energy ground involves various 
topics, neoliberalism with the help of international political economy liberal approach is 
used to explain EU energy security. For the analyse, considering the fuzziness of energy 
security concept, three energy security components reliability, affordability and 
sustainability are used, with applied indicators, to evaluate Azerbaijan’s fit. This thesis 
tries to analyse potential fit to EU energy ground, at the same time considering, that there 
is no gas trade between Azerbaijan and Baku. The thesis finds, that Azerbaijan fits good 
enough to EU energy security framework, but other factors are involved. The reliability 
of supply dimension gives Azerbaijan a positive outlook for being a supplier, yet while 
gas trade will improve cooperation and mutual benefit, the potential risk on transit is high 
due to Russia’s influence and interests in the region. Affordability dimension finds, that 
Azerbaijan’s gas is affordable for the EU market and has been less volatile in price 
fluctuation, but is still highly dependent on oil prices. But the prices are expected to rise 
and will rise Azerbaijan’s motivation towards EU market. Sustainability dimension finds 
that EU will benefit from Caspian import and by 2040 EU gas production has fallen 
almost three times, whereas Azerbaijan’s production has increased by almost three times. 
Due to potential increase in future gas flows, it serves EU’s aims to increase 
environmentally friendlier gas share in energy mix, which is seen as a bridge towards 
renewable energies. The thesis finds that through Azerbaijan’s gas export, EU’s energy 
security ground will benefit from supplies and diversification, while opening up new 
markets in the Caspian region and Middle East through Southern Gas Corridor. 
 
Key words: natural gas, European Union, diversification, cooperation, Azerbaijan, 
energy security, Neoliberalism, International Political Economy, reliability, affordability, 
sustainability, Southern Gas Corridor  
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Introduction 
European Union as a major energy consumer faces numerous challenges to overcome in 
terms of maintaining energy supply and security in future. The main aim of Energy 
Security Strategy, adopted in 2014 by the European Commission, is to achieve stable, 
environmentally sustainable and abundant supply of energy to cope with the future 
demands of European Union (EU)(European Commission 2014(a)). One potential 
pathway to that specific goal would be diversifying external supplies of natural gas, 
because due to its lower impact on environment compared with coal and oil. Gas is seen 
as a bridge towards renewables, which helps to step by step achieve EU aims to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Besides diversifying suppliers, one of the aims is to 
reduce dependence on Russia’s gas import, which is more than a third of total gas imports. 
One of the options for EU is to import Azerbaijan’s gas from Caspian region through 
Southern Gas Corridor via Georgia and Turkey. Azerbaijan, who has a long history of 
energy resource production, being the first state that started industrial oil production at 
the end of 19th century, is now increasing their gas production due to decreasing oil 
resources and market demand. This on the other hand can mean more potential gas 
resources for the EU market and connecting further Caspian region states to a supply 
chain with potential Middle-East states in future. Therefore, it is important to evaluate 
potential energy relationship between EU and Azerbaijan, to see if it fits to the EU energy 
security framework and what factors can affect the future supply. 
The majority of the energy security studies are based on analysing energy 
interdependence between states, which assumes physical trade and mutual effect analysis. 
This thesis tries to look at a long term perspective in the case of EU, because as of 2019, 
there is no physical gas trade between Azerbaijan and EU.  
The main objective of this thesis is to set Azerbaijan to the EU energy security framework 
as a potential future gas supplier and answer a research question through three energy 
dimensions while applying energy security indicators. The research question of this thesis 
is “How would Azerbaijan fit to long-term EU energy security framework?”. Hence, this 
thesis is based on current situation and applies forecasts to see, how Azerbaijan’s role can 
potentially change over time. The overall aim is to give an assessment to a hypothesis 
“Through pursuing energy cooperation with Azerbaijan, European Union will benefit 
from long-term energy security.”. 
6 
 
Thesis is structured as five different sections. The aim of the energy security framework 
part of the thesis is to understand the current EU energy policy pursued by European 
Commission and member states which leads to energy triangle topics. The triangle gives 
an overview of main threats and goals, which EU pursues. First triangle objective is the 
security of supply issues, which shows the need of diversification. Secondly, the 
competitiveness of a free market, which firstly is concerned with natural gas affordability 
and liberalization of the energy market. And the third is sustainability, which reflects the 
environmental issues, but in the case of EU, it is strongly related to the increasing use of 
natural gas to fight climate change. 
Additionally, oil and gas difference needs to be emphasized. It is due to different 
approaches towards the resource, where natural gas in energy security has more complex 
issues due to pipeline security and the difficult process of transporting gas. Oil on the 
other hand is easily transportable and is not as sensitive to interruptions. Therefore it 
serves the logic to understand the potential of Azerbaijan’s supply through Southern Gas 
Corridor. 
The theoretical background of the thesis is based on the neoliberal approach in 
international relations, which is explained through liberal approach in international 
political economy approach on energy. The neoliberal approach assumes, that for actors 
to benefit, they must have positive relations with each other on international arena. In the 
case of energy trade, both consumer and supplier will benefit, which helps to reduce the 
risk of conflict and is overall beneficial to all, based on liberal approach in International 
Political Economy. Due to neoliberal assumptions and growing globalization, actors are 
more interdependent because world’s energy and economy are getting more and more 
integrated. Neoliberalism, with the help of International Political Economy liberal 
approach, helps to take into account free market, sustainability issues on climate change, 
that can also affect security. These matters can also be seen in the EU energy security 
goals and strategies. 
The conceptualization section is based on the fuzzy concept of energy security and shows 
that there is no common approach to the issue. Energy security is strongly context 
dependent and it is used to justify or explain different policies taken by actors. Though 
various authors describe energy security through different dimensions, the main 
components remain the same - security, affordability and environmental issues. The 
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section concludes with Brenda Shaffer’s three dimensions of energy security, which are 
reliability, affordability and environmental sustainability. They conform to the EU energy 
triangle and International Energy Agency goals. Each dimension is described and put in 
to the EU’s framework. 
The analysis section of the thesis focuses on three dimensions and their elaboration. 
Firstly, the reliability dimension which includes three components. The first is the 
diversification section that gives an overview of potential diversification possibilities and 
aims to show why Azerbaijan seems to be the most promising and logical supplier. 
Secondly, the transit section that describes Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey as a supply 
chain and the factors that can affect supply transportation. Additionally, the parts of 
Southern Gas Corridor will be looked at and their attributes, the role of Russia’s influence 
in the region and finally the legal status of Caspian Sea and complexity of the littoral 
states situation. Finally, Azerbaijan’s physical supply and properties in case of supply 
will be analysed as one of the main components for a reliable supply of gas.  
Secondly, the dimension of affordability tries to give an overview of the price trends of 
natural gas in European Union. Hence, it must be considered, that oil prices have a strong 
effect on gas prices and therefore oil and gas price volatility is looked at with the 
consumption patterns of EU. The aim here is to find out if prices and consumption are 
related and if it has an effect on gas consumption. Finally, Azerbaijan’s export prices are 
analysed to see volatility, price range and how it would estimatedly fit to EU energy prices 
together with future gas price forecast by World Bank. 
The final dimension, environmental sustainability, firstly looks at the EU energy mix and 
the share of gas and renewables. Secondly at the greenhouse gas emission as CO2 per 
capita is analysed and how the current progress reflects on long term climate goals. And 
thirdly, the EU long term forecast for natural gas, provided by International Energy 
Agency, tries to predict future trends, which indicate a drastic decrease of EU’s 
production of gas and a growing import dependence up to 90% of total consumption. 
Azerbaijan will here be looked at as their potential gas output growth and how big 
hypothetical share it would have on the EU energy mix. Sustainability in EU means 
moving towards renewables, decreasing oil and coal through gas and therefore, a supply 
from Azerbaijan can be seen as a component to achieve these goals. 
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The single exploratory case study is used for conducting the analysis. The main reason is 
the fuzziness of the energy security approaches and that Azerbaijan is strongly context 
dependent. This approach seems to best describe the current overall issues regarding 
Azerbaijan-EU energy security and energy cooperation by author’s point of view. This 
thesis applies simple energy indicators instead of complex, because of the lack of 
available data. Simple indicators are taken from Sovacool’s and Mukherjee’s (2011) 
research. They conducted a synthesized approach and created their five dimensions based 
on interviews with people related to energy security. They found 320 simple indicators 
and 52 complex indicators, that can be used in energy analysis.  
This thesis strongly relies on Brenda Shaffer’s “Energy Politics” (2009) to set up three 
dimensions and for providing an overview of natural gas as a commodity. She is one of 
the most know contemporary researchers, who mostly looks at natural gas issues related 
to energy security. In case of diversification, the geopolitical overview in relation with 
energy is mostly based on Ratner et. al (2013). 
The data taken from the analysis of indicators is strongly based on British Petroleum 
Statistics, especially consumption, production and its ratio, prices and CO2 emission. 
Also, British Petroleum releases annual energy outlooks and is a trusted source of 
information and it has a long history of producing on Caspian Basin. Eurostat and 
European Environmental Agency service data will be used as providers of information 
on the EU level besides British Petroleum Statistics. Info about Azerbaijan’s gas export 
and prices were derived from The States Statistical Committee of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan’s statistics. Forecasts are based on World Bank predictions and International 
Energy Agency predictions based on 2018 outlook. World Bank’s, as a finance 
organization’s predictions on natural gas prices up to 2030 are based on the current 
situation and on their models. International Energy Agency collects its information from 
various sources and every year they give an overlook of the previous year. They create 
sustainable development scenario and every year they compare it with new policy 
scenarios based on current trends in energy sector and their information is widely used as 
a primary source. 
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1. A conceptual and theoretical overview 
 
1.1.  EU energy security framework 
The following chapter gives an overview of European Union’s main issues on energy 
policy emphasizing on current energy security approaches mainly presented by European 
Commission as a supranational institution trying to coordinate common goals in terms of 
energy. Additionally, the aim is to give an overview of what are the main components of 
energy security policy pursued by the EU. 
 
Changing energy policy in European Union 
The importance of energy in European Union has been one of the main elements in 
creating more integrated union. In the case of EU as the treaty-based was created by 
Treaty of Paris in 1951, where European Coal and Steel Community was created, 
followed by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, where European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM) was created (Shaffer 2009:128). Despite that, according to Shaffer, energy 
was one of the first spheres of common action for the EU and driver for Europe’s 
integration and there was no common EU energy policy along member states. Until 2007, 
common EU energy policy was discussed only within the framework of environmental 
policies, but gas disputes between Russia and Post-Soviet States, such as Ukraine, 
Belarus, Georgia gave a signal, that EU needs comprehensive energy policy. Increasing 
dependency on Russia’s gas raised questions on energy security and reliable suppliers 
(Shaffer 2009:128-129).  
Despite the gas disputes, there are more aspects that are changing EU energy situation in 
the 21st century. Considering the geographical distribution of the EU, some states are 
more dependent on energy imports and primary energy resources are depleting. Due to 
the high demand of energy in case of economic growth and sustainability, achieving EU’s 
energy security goals must be taken into consideration. EU imports more than 50% of its 
total energy consumption, where crude oil is almost 90% of it, natural gas about 2/3 of 
consumption, according to European Commission. The dependence on a single supplier 
is seen as a threat to those who have only one external operator, for example the Baltic 
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states (European Commission 2014(a):2). The EU external policy is seen as a crucial 
element to complete internal energy market. The fundamental importance and a core goal 
of EU security policy is to have secure, sustainable and competitive energy (European 
Commission 2011:2). 
Overall, based on Umbach (2009), world is not facing an overall shortage of resources in 
terms of producing energy, but EU is facing a depletion of its own natural resources. This 
raises a question of emerging economies like China and India, that affect global gas 
prices. This also leads to “high energy politics” where oil and gas markets are affected, 
with challenges related to climate changes, by state players (Umbach 2009:1230). 
Considering the internal and external challenges that EU faces, in 2014 European 
Commission published the European Energy Security strategy, which was strongly 
affected by the Ukraine Crisis that started in 2013 and also had great effect on the EU gas 
supply considerations because Ukraine is a major Russian gas transit state. These events 
showed how vulnerable the EU gas market is and how dependent it is on Russia. A 
common energy-related security strategy to set down clear principles and key areas what 
to follow and achieve is therefore needed. 
 
EU Energy Security Strategy 
The aim of the EU Energy Security Strategy is to “…set out areas where decisions need 
to be taken or concrete actions implemented in the short, medium and longer term to 
respond to energy security concerns” through eight key pillars. These pillars were “1. 
Immediate actions aimed at increasing the EU's capacity to overcome a major disruption 
during the winter 2014/2015; 2. Strengthening emergency/solidarity mechanisms 
including coordination of risk assessments and contingency plans; and protecting 
strategic infrastructure; 3. Moderating energy demand; 4. Building a well-functioning 
and fully integrated internal market; 5. Increasing energy production in the European 
Union; 6. Further developing energy technologies; 7. Diversifying external supplies and 
related infrastructure; 8. Improving coordination of national energy policies and 
speaking with one voice in external energy policy (European Commission 2014(a):3).” 
This thesis aims to explore Azerbaijan’s role and importance for EU, as the seventh pillar 
is related to diversifying external supplies and the importance of Southern Gas Corridor 
was mentioned by getting at least 10 bcm/y (billion cubic meters/ year) to European 
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market and opening future possibilities for natural gas in Caspian region and Middle East 
by 2020 (European Commission 2014(a):16). 
Though, all pillars describe the situation in 2014 and had key actions set for long term 
security purposes based on that time circumstances. Additionally, long term energy 
security goals laid down in key were related to Energy Strategy 2020 expect pillars 1 and 
8 (European Commission 2014(a)).  
 
Long term energy security goals 
 “Energy 2020: A strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy” presented in 
2010 brought out five priorities: 1) achieving an energy efficient Europe; 2) building a 
truly pan-European integrated energy market; 3) empowering consumers and achieving 
the highest level of safety and security; 4) extending Europe’s leadership in energy 
technology and innovation and finally 5) strengthening the external dimension of the EU 
energy market (European Commission 2010:5-6). The first four priorities are aimed for 
the integration of EU states and efficiency on producing energy while aiming to cut down 
emission gases and to lower the impact on climate. The fifth one focuses on foreign policy 
goals and four actions were presented: integrating energy markets and regulatory 
frameworks with our neighbors; establishing privileged partnerships with key partners; 
promoting the global role of the EU for a future of low-carbon energy and fourthly 
promoting legally binding nuclear-safety, security and non-proliferation standards 
worldwide (European Commission 2010:18-19). As follows, EU took a clear promoter’s 
position on energy efficiency and low-carbon energy production which also aims for 
partner states to have bilateral relations with EU.  
The energy roadmaps for 2020 (European Commission 2010), 2020-2030 (European 
Commission 2014(b)) and 2050 (European Commission 2012) are linked, starting from 
achieving 2020 goals and improving the situation by 2030 and ideally by 2050 these all 
should be met. The framework is laid down and EU pursues towards these goals step by 
step implementing changes to its common energy security with member states in different 
spheres of energy security. 
 
 
 
12 
 
EU Energy Triangle 
The overall EU energy objectives can be divided into three dimensions, which are security 
of supply, sustainability and competitiveness (referred also as internal market), which 
according to Szulecki et al. (2016) remain unaltered and the emphasis given to each 
objective goal is still open (Szulecki et al. 2016:549). These objectives are emphasized 
by policy makers and are mentioned in different EU documents. For example, an EC 
document "The EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners beyond Our Borders" as a 
fundamental importance (European Commission 2011:2).  
There is no common energy security definition by the EU, yet one of the most used 
definition origins from Green Paper presented by the European Commission in 2000. 
There the definition on energy security is as follows “uninterrupted physical availability 
of energy products on the market, at a price which is affordable for all consumers (private 
and industrial), while respecting environmental concerns and looking towards 
sustainable development” (European Commission 2000). This definition is related to the 
triangle objectives as security of supply stands for uninterrupted physical availability of 
energy products; competitiveness through the affordability and sustainability in the case 
of respecting environment. 
Related to the security of supply dimensions, the importance of natural gas will grow in 
EU energy mix and is needed as a backup fuel for various electricity generation (European 
Commission 2010:10). Shaffer brings out that the security of supply policy, in the case 
of natural gas, is ensured when there is diversity in energy, the country of origin and also 
in transit. In the case of creating a linkage through infrastructure, the security of supply 
policy will encompass independent gas pipelines from Caspian region and it would not 
go through Russia (Shaffer 2009:132). The Energy Security Strategy also brings out that 
creating a relationship with a new supplier through critical infrastructure to Caspian 
region is preparing ground for future resources from there and beyond (European 
Commission 2014(a):16). Therefore security of supply in the case of natural gas is 
achieved through long-term external suppliers in EU’s perspective. 
Competitiveness refers to a single market. In the case of natural gas, the opportunity to 
diversify suppliers depends on whether import capacities are made available and when 
gas will be sold with affordable prices (European Commission 2014(a):16). In the case 
of making energy market work and adding external natural gas suppliers to the single 
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market, it reflects Commission’s measures in fully liberal way, but Goldthau, Sitter also 
stresses on the threat, that gas markets are far from textbook examples of a free gas market 
due to pipeline connection and regionality of trade (Goldthau; Sitter 2014: 1465). 
Sustainability, as mentioned above, relates to environmental issues. European 
Commission has a long-term plan until 2050 to cut down emission by 80-95% and it 
strongly relies on decarbonization and energy efficiency in the case of environmental 
goals, which means increasing renewables share in energy mix. Also, it means that EU 
has to agree on tools and policies, which would make the shift and continuing on a 
sustainable path possible (European Commission 2010:2-3). States in EU are called up to 
influence their fuel mix towards new directions, which means importing more 
environmentally friendly energy, such as natural gas and nuclear energy and renewable 
sources, but this has an effect on dependency that must be considered (Chalvatzis; Hooper 
2009:2704). 
While the EU common energy policy has three dimensions, it is still important to fit 
natural gas inside the framework and explain its special properties related to energy 
security. The following chapter tries to address the main issues. 
 
1.2. Gas role in energy security 
Brenda Shaffer (2009) discusses the relationship between energy and international 
politics in the 21st century and finds that energy and politics are inseparable. Where 
international politics are interconnected, energy security is the key for improving national 
security by ensuring primary commodities. Furthermore, energy creates interdependence 
in the international system, and market conditions lead to increased internationalization 
of political developments in the energy sector. Shaffer stresses that natural gas in the 
current era is the center of energy security policies due to the fact that it is more vulnerable 
and has high political influence, meaning that there is more opportunities for politics to 
affect energy relations between states, including transit states. In the case of transit states, 
she follows, they tend to use energy as a weapon. On the other hand, supplier states and 
consumer states use it infrequently to achieve their economic and political goals (Shaffer 
2009:3-5) 
Hence, Shaffer brings out the nexus relationship between energy and politics, where the 
best suitable for gas are (Shaffer 2009:3-5): 
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● “Energy and politics are inseparable. Energy trends and international politics 
are innately interconnected and energy security is an integral part of the foreign 
and national security policies of states.” 
● “Energy creates an additional link between the domestic and foreign policies of 
states. The impact of hydrocarbon use on climate change, energy prices, and 
concerns about energy supply availability have made a state’s domestic energy 
consumption habits and policies a matter of international political interest and 
concern.” 
● “In the current era, natural gas is at the center of energy security policies due to 
its extreme vulnerability to political influence. In fact, the gas trade is much more 
vulnerable to political influence than the oil trade. With a rise in the global use of 
natural gas and surging cross-border natural gas trade, there is more opportunity 
for politics to affect energy supply relations.” 
● “The major energy-consuming markets are privatizing and unbundling energy 
production, transport, and supply, while energy production is becoming more and 
more concentrated in the hands of states. This has created an uneven playing field 
between consumers and producers, which provides the opportunity for state-held 
producers like Russia’s Gazprom to gain control of a significant chunk of 
infrastructure.” 
 
Main key differences between oil and natural gas 
Shaffer (2009) brings out that by its nature, natural gas is more susceptible to political 
considerations than oil and the 21st century is also called as “the era of gas”. The main 
difference is that oil has little connections between supplier and consumer, while natural 
gas, on the other hand, demands pipelines for creating linkages. The long-term relations, 
according to Shaffer, come from the high price of natural gas, because it requires transport 
infrastructure - LNG or pipelines. All these carry high costs, especially building the 
pipelines, which are long term projects in need of long-term relationship between actors. 
This also requires actors to put effort into ensuring positive political and security relations 
and cooperation before undertaking a major project. Therefore, it shows, that oil has some 
benefits, because it is easier to deliver and has vast logistical infrastructure in place 
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already, but gas is doing the same transition as oil did in the 20th century (Shaffer 
2009:35-37). 
Shaffer in her article “Natural gas supply stability and foreign policy” (2013) continues 
that the gas consumption in the world is going to grow due to its relatively low 
environmental impact and her focus is on gas trading states and their relations. The main 
principle proposed by Shaffer is that gas disruption cannot be only initiated by the 
supplier, but the transit states and consumer states are also capable of doing that. 
Furthermore, she identifies three types of gas supply relations: a) where neither side is 
dependent on gas trade; b) where one side is dependent on trade; c) interdependency of 
gas trade from both sides (Shaffer 2013:114-115). She also predicts that natural gas 
consumption will increase not only in volumes but also in international trade level 
(Shaffer 2013:124). 
In the context of European Union’s natural gas, concerns mostly indicate diversification 
and that gas supplies are hard to replace. The expectable growth of natural gas in the 
European energy mix is explained as a means of diversification from unreliable oil 
supplies and as a bridge towards renewables, where the aim is a transition from fossil 
fuels towards friendlier fuels aiming post-carbon era (Proedrou 2016:68). 
 
1.3. Conceptual framework 
Over time, the meaning of energy security has shifted from being a matter of physical 
power and military strength, from a traditional realism vision, to economic aspects and 
environmental issues as strong affecting factors of energy security matters. Since the 
beginning of the 20th century energy security was mostly related with supplying 
necessary fuels for the military (Cherp; Jewell 2011:202). The first time the energy 
security was included in national energy calculations was when Winston Churchill 
decided to change the power source of the Royal Navy from coal to oil in 1912 and it has 
become as one preconditions for conduction modern warfare (Shaffer 2009:66). The 
modern approach and debate on energy security emerged in 1973-4 when the world was 
struck by the first oil crises and liberal approach found more attention (Van de Graaf et 
al. 2016:10). This is when it was understood that energy security is not only about military 
power, but extends to various problems in the world, for example economic effects 
(Biresselioglu 2011:10).  
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The traditional understanding of energy security has changed: militarism and securing 
resources abroad remained still in scope, but the approach to energy security took a wider 
meaning and obtained new dimensions. Maxwell D. Tylor wrote on the energy crisis in 
1973/4 that “One could hardly hope to find a better example of the seriousness of 
nonmilitary threats to national security than the present energy crisis” (Taylor 1974:592).  
 
1.3.1. Neoliberalism 
As the name neoliberalism suggests, neo means a revised and wider approach to 
liberalism. In 20th century, with the emergence of neoliberal thought surfaced the notion 
that IR agenda has expanded into the non-military, economics and environmental arenas, 
which now act as explanatory factors in the system change theories (Evans, Newnham 
1998:29). 
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye have influenced the neoliberal school of thought, 
which emerged as a response to challenge neorealism. They are considered as founders 
of the neoliberal school of thought as they try to explain world and power issues through 
interdependence (mutual dependence), where they respond to the realist assumption of 
world politics. After they established differences between realism and complex 
interdependence, they argued that “complex interdependence comes closer to reality than 
does it realism” (Keohane; Nye 2001:20).  
Through the interdependence approach, the scholars opened a new chapter in neoliberal 
way of thinking in international relations, where neoliberalism claims that there is no 
hierarchy between “high politics” and “low politics” (Bõsz 2017:205). The absence of 
hierarchy among the issues based on Nye and Keohane means that military and security 
policy does not consistently dominate the agenda of international politics, but various 
issues, like economic goals etc., can have their place. (Keohane; Nye 2001:21). This also 
reflects the liberal assumption that economic incentives tend to be as important as 
concerns for security for maintaining their position in the international system (Keohane: 
Nye 2001:269). 
As mentioned, the debates of neoliberalism and neorealism have showed the key 
differences between these two schools of thought. Proedrou overall brings out the main 
difference that “neoliberalism thus makes it explicit that world politics is not a continuous 
struggle for power, as neo-realists claim, but a field where one can encounter both 
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cooperation and conflict” (Proedrou 2007:331). The idea of cooperation in neoliberalist 
sense contradicts realism’s anarchy and uncertainty assumptions, where “neoliberalism 
maintains that cooperation is possible, when the perceived benefits are high and 
perceived costs low; therefore, it is the calculation of costs and benefits and not anarchy 
that will determine whether cooperation will be achieved” (Proedrou 2007:330-331). 
From a broader neoliberal perspective, Keohane’s idea of cooperation holds that 
governments pursue self-interests through different deals, which can be beneficial for 
both sides. Cooperation will only take place, where states’ policies are actually or 
potentially in conflict. Ideally, without conflict or risk there is no need to cooperate. 
Furthermore, Keohane stresses that “attainment of the gains from pursuing 
complementary policies depend on cooperation” (Keohane 1984:53-54).  
 
1.3.2. International Political Economy: Liberalism 
To understand neoliberalism’s relation to energy, international political economy’s 
tradition of liberal approach will be described. The aim is to show main applications of 
energy in their view of thought, which relates to the main ideas of neoliberalism.  
The oil crisis and other economic changes in the beginning of 1970s led to the emergence 
of international political economy (IPE) as a subfield to international relations theories 
due to real-world changes. One of the reasons for IPE’s emergence was that realism could 
not take account changes taking place across the world, since it described the world as 
anarchic arena where states struggle over power and energy resources without taking into 
consideration economic concerns derived from integration of global energy markets Van 
de Graaf et al. 2016:10). Main traditions of IPE trichotomy as mercantilism/realism, 
liberalism, marxism have their own assumptions and applications to energy (Van de Graaf 
et al. 2016:13). New approaches through other theories have come to debate on hence IPE 
still cannot be understood as coherent and unified intellectual theory in IR, but it tries to 
combine economics, politics and other details to explain the changing processes in world. 
Energy in IPE is one of the main topics of debates and research agendas which attempt to 
integrate politics, geopolitics and other issues in the framework of nowadays world (Van 
de Graaf et al. 2016:14-18).  
According to Van de Graaf et al. (2016), the main assumption in the liberal approach in 
IPE is that politics and economics exist in separate spheres with emphasis on free market, 
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which ideally is efficient and morally desirable in allocating resources. Liberalists claim 
that consumers, companies and international organizations are equivalent to states in their 
importance. The role of a state is to ensure smooth and optimal, relatively unfettered 
functioning of the markets. Hence, liberalists, in the realm of economics, reject the view 
of a state as central actor, since the private sector should be more involved. Energy is 
mainly seen as a commodity, which involves numerous actors, and in their point of view 
energy market should be left for the “invisible hand” so it can be beneficial for everybody. 
Liberalization of energy and gas markets is seen desirable, because energy is understood 
as a commodity like any other in their view. In liberalist view, interdependence through 
energy trade centers on international level, a condition which ideally should lower the 
risk of conflict, and this again refers to the “beneficial to all” idea. In case of liberalist 
application to energy, they see that international organizations can help with negotiations 
to avoid dangerous climate change, bringing in the idea of sustainability (Van de Graaf 
et al. 2016:13-15).  
 
1.3.3. Application of Neoliberalism to EU energy security 
Proedrou mentions, that energy is a hard case to capture for neoliberals, mostly due to its 
complicated role in development, welfare and survival of states and their economies, yet 
he maintains that it is better at explaining energy in the EU compared to the realist 
approach (Proedrou 2007:330). Considering neoliberal thought of school and IPE liberal 
approach to energy, the EU energy security framework with triangle can be related to a 
theory, where cooperation and economics play important role in energy security for EU 
in achieving its goals without military means. 
Goldthau and Sitter, dealing specifically with the dynamics surrounding the EU, suggest 
that the challenges related to market governance are increasingly intertwined with 
including energy into the EU’s regulatory efforts (Goldthau; Sitter 2015:18). Hence, EU 
energy security and politics is designed and promoted by European Commission, where 
it is tried to predict and maintain proper functioning of the single market in the EU and 
to decrease potential vulnerability through energy integration and cooperation. 
Considering EU’s liberal entity, cooperation plays a key role on external level which is 
mentioned also in the EU Energy Security Strategy:  
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 “…energy security issues are addressed only at a national level without taking fully into 
account the interdependence of Member States. The key to improved energy security lies 
first in a more collective approach through a functioning internal market and greater 
cooperation at regional and European levels, in particular for coordinating network 
developments and opening up markets, and second, in a more coherent external action 
(emphasis added, EC 2014(a):3).” 
According to Youngs’, energy cooperation within the unique nature of European Union 
as an intra-European international body devises an extra-European international policy, 
where external policy extends the nature of internal cooperation developed between 
member states (Youngs 2007:4). The cooperation towards Caspian littoral states can be 
seen since 2004 in the case of energy, when Baku Initiative was launched with an aim to 
develop regional energy markets through network interconnections. The aim of the 
reform in the region relies on EU regulations for having energy on internal energy market, 
on the other hand EU supports and aids their development through funding 
(Youngs:2007:3). 
Overall, theoretical assumption for this thesis is based on neoliberalism and that European 
Union does not have a hierarchy in their agendas. Economic issues on energy market are 
important and decreasing vulnerability by increasing diversity of suppliers through 
cooperation promoted in their external policy. A specific case of securing the supply of 
Azerbaijan’s gas relies strongly on cooperation tools and on free market rules. The theory 
assumes that through pursuing energy cooperation with Azerbaijan, European Union will 
benefit its own energy security and Azerbaijan will benefit from selling its gas to the EU 
market. The hypothesis is set down as follows “Through pursuing energy cooperation 
with Azerbaijan, European Union will benefit on long-term energy security”. 
 
1.4. Conceptualization of energy security 
In order to understand energy security approaches while considering its fuzzy concept, 
various different concepts will be presented and main core elements identified. Due to 
European energy security approach various aspects and ways of interpretation of energy 
security must be considered to set an approach to security framework. 
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A fuzzy concept of energy security 
The first definitions of energy security in 1970s and ‘80s were mostly market-centric, 
when ongoing processes of globalization, integration of energy markets and different new 
aspects like environmental issues etc. had caused a versatility of energy security 
definitions (Chester 2010:887-889). Felix Ciută mentions difficulties of energy entity in 
his article “Conceptual Notes on Energy Security: Total or Banal Security?”. He states 
that “energy security clearly means many different things to different authors and actors, 
and even at times to the same author or actor” (Ciută 2010:124). 
Coupled with the multitude of definitions on energy security, Benjamin Sovacool presents 
45 definitions from different authors and institutions, while stressing that the concept has 
become diffuse and often incoherent. He follows that “multitude of definitions serve some 
strategic value which enables people to advance very different notions of energy security 
so that they can then justify actions and policies on energy security ground” (Sovacool 
2010:3). With this in mind, Christian Winzer also mentions that energy security has 
become an umbrella term for different policy goals due to the absence of clear definition 
(Winzer 2012:36). 
 
Different definitions in energy security studies 
In 2007, one of the debated approaches, Asia Pacific Research Centre (APERC) 
researchers introduced four A-s and defined energy security as the “ability of an economy 
to guarantee the availability of energy resource supply in a sustainable and timely manner 
with the energy price being at a level that will not adversely affect the economic 
performance of the economy”, clearly referring to the four A-s. The four A-s are: 
availability, accessibility, acceptability and affordability and they align with their 
presented elements of energy security. APERC report also bind elements related to four 
A-s affecting energy security (Intharak et al. 2007:6): 
 
1) the availability of fuel reserves, both domestically and by external suppliers;  
2) the ability of an economy to acquire supply to meet projected energy demand;  
3)the level of an economy’s energy resource diversification and energy supplier 
diversification;  
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4) accessibility to fuel resources, in terms of the availability of related energy 
infrastructure and energy transportation infrastructure;  
5) geopolitical concerns surrounding resource acquisition. 
 
The four A-s caused a wide debate over energy security and interpretation, but still found 
a place in energy analyses. Acceptability and affordability were relatively new in energy 
studies, they are more complex and do not have as straightforward analysis on a similar 
scale as the one that availability and accessibility have obtained through decades. 
Furthermore, Cherp and Jewell argue that the definition and four A-s derived from 
APERC were lacking in logical reasoning regarding to their application, since the existing 
reasoning for the four A-s did not rely on or referred to relevant academic literature. In 
their view they questioned whether the report, as whole, constitutes as a generic concept 
or essential characteristics of energy security. Furthermore, they claimed that the four A-
s approach does not address the security issues and in their definition energy security is a 
low vulnerability of vital energy systems. In their opinion analysing energy security 
concept should at first try to address Baldwin’s three question about security (Cherp; 
Jewell 2014:416-417):  
1. Security for whom? 
2. Security of witch values? 
3. From what threats? 
Despite the criticism towards four A-s as new idea of analyzing energy security, Bert 
Kruyt et al. adhered the four A-s in their approach: availability or elements relating to 
geological existence; accessibility or geopolitical elements; affordability or economical 
elements and acceptability or environmental and societal elements (Kruyt et al. 
2009:2167). As a framework for energy security they claim that it is based on the notion 
that an uninterrupted supply of energy is critical for a functioning economy. As gas is 
considered a long-term energy security perspective, they mention that short and long-time 
scales are connected and under-investment and efforts on energy security field can 
increase the risk of disruptions in general (Kruyt et al. 2009:2167-2168). Overall, they 
apply a lot of indicators what should be considered on national energy security to APERC 
four A-s, explaining that those indicators are context-dependent and also their 
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elaboration. For example, an indicator of political stability is dependent on paradigm and 
is used qualitatively in policy making (Kruyt et al. 2009:2169-2172).  
Jonathan Elkind has an approach to elements of energy security that is similar to four A-
s, but he names the elements availability, reliability, affordability and sustainability. He 
claims that the concept of energy security incorporates the four elements but countries 
never evaluate their priorities and vulnerabilities identically. He adds that one country 
may favor affordability and availability but it can still face challenges in reliability and 
sustainability of energy security (Elkind; Pascual 2010:130). 
Sovacool together with Marilyn Brown defines energy security through interconnected 
factors of availability, affordability, efficiency and environmental stewardship which are 
key elements in analysing energy issues and their impact. With availability they stress the 
importance of diversification and safety of supply. Affordability is based on the quality 
and price on producing energy without putting the environment in danger. Efficiency is 
based on innovation and technology needed to evaluate energy security. Finally, 
economic stewardship aims to cope with climate change and in their opinion, this is one 
of the most important elements of energy security nowadays (Sovacool; Brown 2010:80-
85). 
Considering all the above mentioned, one of the modern definitions was provided by 
International Energy Agency. They define it as “the uninterrupted availability of energy 
sources at an affordable price” (IEA 2014:13). This mainstream definition is now used 
by IEA and it involves two traditional elements - availability and affordability, which are 
still important dimensions when analysing the energy security. Besides that, Shaffer 
brings out that IEA has also set its goals towards promoting basic needs of energy security 
through reliable, affordable and also clean energy (Shaffer 2009:95). These three 
components of energy security emphasized by contemporary energy expert Shaffer, with 
the attention on natural gas, the notions of concepts are emerging in academic literature 
and also in primary documents, such as IEA outlooks and analyses (Shaffer 2009:93)(IEA 
2018). Therefore this thesis relies on her three components. 
Shaffer says that “energy security includes three components: reliability, affordability, 
environmental friendliness1.” Considering the fuzziness and multitude of definitions, 
                                                 
1 Shaffer uses also environmental sustainability in her works 
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Brenda Shaffer presents and stands for the three main components of energy security in 
her book “Energy Politics”. Shaffer states that some countries use one component more 
than others. For example, USA puts more attention on reliability of supplies, while EU 
rather on affordability and friendliness to the environment. Shaffer stresses, that natural 
gas needs a completely separate approach compared to oil. The main components might 
remain same, but gas presents a greater challenge to energy security than oil (Shaffer 
2009:91-94). Additionally, her three components go with the EU energy triangle 
dimensions and seem more straightforward and relevant in terms of analysing natural gas 
issues related to EU and Azerbaijan. 
As various definitions show, energy security is fuzzy, but it all serves the purpose of 
analysing energy. These concepts shown above, the topics from geopolitics to energy 
efficiency, serve strategic value in research and all seem to indicate vulnerabilities that 
arise or questions that must be addressed to justify actions or concerns on energy ground. 
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2. Methods and data 
 
This thesis conducts an exploratory single case study in case of the dependent variable 
“The fit of Azerbaijan as a supplier to EU” through the three components presented by 
Brenda Shaffer (reliability, affordability and environmental sustainability) which can be 
related to the EU energy triangle framework. Descriptive exploratory case study on 
Azerbaijan was chosen assess and analyse how Azerbaijan’s natural gas, as a commodity, 
would fit to the EU energy security framework through three main components of energy 
security. The aim of this thesis is to answer a research question “How would Azerbaijan’s 
natural gas fit in to the EU long-term energy security framework?” and to assess it as it 
“fits perfectly”, “fits partially”, “does not fit” or “fits good enough but other factors might 
be involved” to EU energy security framework. Furthermore, the aim is to also assess the 
theoretical hypothesis that “through pursuing energy cooperation with Azerbaijan, 
European Union will benefit on long-term energy security”. 
The exploratory case study is chosen due to multiple reasons. The posed research question 
in this thesis is a “how” question which refers to an exploratory case design and is asked 
about contemporary set of events, over which the investigator has little or no control (Yin 
2003:8-9). Based on Streb, the exploratory case studies, by definition, can be applied in 
a research context which is not clearly specified. Furthermore, considering the fuzzy 
concept of energy security and lack of detailed preliminary research analysing Shaffer’s 
three components of energy security by certain energy indicators, the exploratory case 
study helps to accomplish proposed goals of the thesis. With the high degree of flexibility, 
data collection and independence on research design serves the goal of this thesis when 
data is reliable and valid (Streb 2010:374). The complexity of analysing energy security 
can put as follows: “energy security is like a Rorschach inkblot test, you can see whatever 
you want to see in it” (Sovacool; Mukherjee 2011:5346). 
Neoliberal theory and IPE liberal application on energy, where international energy trade 
of commodities, natural gas in this case, creates interdependence and is beneficial for all, 
at the same time reducing risk of conflict (Van de Graaf et al. 2016:15). Neoliberal 
interdependence’s analytical concept has been used widely in analysing international 
transactions between states, flow of goods etc., through two dimensions, vulnerability and 
sensitivity (Keohane, Nye 2001:7-10). Yet this thesis cannot apply interdependence 
theory between EU and Azerbaijan, because at the moment there is no flow of goods in 
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case of natural gas and it predicts future possibilities of Azerbaijan as a supplier through 
the prism of energy security. Yet turning back to liberalist approach to reduce risk of 
conflict, it indicates vulnerability. Therefore fitting Azerbaijan to EU energy framework 
must first include analysing EU issues related to natural gas and then how Azerbaijan will 
fit to this framework of energy security emphasizing on the three dimensions presented 
by Brenda Shaffer. 
 
2.1. Reliability 
Brenda Shaffer defines reliability of supply “that a state has regular, non-interrupted 
access to energy in the quantity and forms it requires”. In case of reliability, the stress is 
on a regular access to supply, that is non-interrupted and can deliver commodity from 
supplier to customer (Shaffer 2009:93)”. Her definition leaves a lot of room for 
interpretation but the main elements that arise are availability of supply and accessibility 
in case of non-interrupted access related to Azerbaijan. 
Elkind’s definition of reliability connates to Shaffer’s definition, as it involves the extent 
to which energy services are protected from interruptions (Elkind; Pascual 2010:124). 
The aim to analyse reliability in terms on non-interrupted supply of gas, then according 
to Shaffer the transit states tend to use energy as a weapon, what is strongly related to 
non-interrupted supply of energy (Shaffer 2009:4). According to Shaffer “transit states 
are more likely to be tempted to use their role to elicit economic, security, and other gains 
(Shaffer 2009:40).” Hence, on all sides, both supplier and consumer, transit states energy 
is seen as a tool to promote foreign policy and security goals (Shaffer 2009:29). In terms 
of EU, natural gas from landlocked Azerbaijan will be retrieved by pipeline through 
transit states Georgia and Turkey which can affect reliability. 
EU Energy Security Strategy relates to reliability with stating that “accessing more 
diversified natural gas resources is a priority whilst maintaining significant import 
volumes from reliable suppliers” (European Commission 2014(a):15). Bert Kruyt et.al. 
state that availability of energy resources is often used as a direct indicator for energy 
security and security of supply (Kruyt et al. 2009:2168). 
Overall, this thesis divides the analysis of reliability dimension to three categories which 
seems most relevant when analysing Azerbaijan’s fit to the framework. Firstly, 
diversification is used to find out EU’s alternatives for gas and give reason why 
26 
 
Azerbaijan is emphasized. Secondly, transit dimension as a supply chain is used to 
evaluate possible concerns of transporting supplies from Azerbaijan to EU border. And 
thirdly, the natural gas as a physical availability of Azerbaijan and its prospects. The 
transit states and politics in the region can be considered as intervening variables, which 
can minimize or maximize the possibility of forming solid cooperation between the 
Azerbaijan and EU. 
 
2.2. Affordability 
Affordability refers to the cost of product consumed. EU Energy strategy brings out that 
gas supply will be safe “...if import infrastructure capacities are made available and if 
gas volumes are on sale at an affordable price… (European Commission 2014(a):16)”. 
Shaffer’s definition of affordability is “hat it has access to energy supplies at a price that 
can be sustained economically and promotes economic growth”. Affordability promotes 
economic growth which indicates, that prices should be reasonable and should not hinder 
the economy. (Shaffer 2009:93). Elkind explains affordability in a quite simple manner 
saying that “energy that is not affordable in absolute terms is energy that cannot be 
used”. Some of the main components, according to Elkind, are low price volatility and 
realistic expectations for future prices (Elkind; Pascual 2010:126). 
Shaffer states that natural gas supplies make it more susceptible to political considerations 
as compared to oil. One reason is that natural gas has stronger connections between 
supplier and consumer due to long-term linkage and contracts which indicates to long 
term cooperation and relationship (Shaffer 2009:36). Long-term relations reflect in 
investments by investors, because nowadays it takes at least 15-20 years before the 
investments can be recouped. This also makes participating states and companies to put 
effort into having positive political and security relations, which then indicates 
cooperation (Shaffer 2009:38). Natural gas price on market depends on various aspects, 
for example, is the price linked to global oil price. And also many contracts are drafted 
with primary exporters on a “take or pay” basis, where consumers must buy a certain 
amount of gas whether it is actually consumed or not (Shaffer 2009:13). In case of 
commercial considerations, gas can be considered as a weapon which EU tries to avoid 
and therefore looks for diversification of the market. (Shaffer 2009:42-45).  
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This thesis divides analysis of affordability into two sections: current gas prices in EU 
and long-term projections of natural gas prices and the possible price of Azerbaijan gas. 
As there is no import from Azerbaijan, the suitability of prices can be evaluated. 
 
2.3. Environmental Sustainability 
Energy Strategy 2020 (goals emphasized also in EU Energy Security Strategy) mentions 
that “the central goals for energy policy (security of supply, competitiveness, and 
sustainability) are now laid down in the Lisbon Treaty” (European Commission 2010:2). 
Environmental sustainability is important for meeting EU norms and values towards 
lowering the impact to the environment and in Article 1942 “(c) promote energy efficiency 
and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy” gave 
clear signal for member states for the goals. 
Shaffer’s definition on environmental sustainability states that “prevailing form of energy 
provides for environmental sustainability and does not incur high health costs for 
residents.” She also states that “policies that lead to the reduced release of climate-
altering gases (Shaffer 2009:93).” In case of EU she refers to EU Green Paper 2000, 
where three main core goals mentioned are sustainable development, competitiveness and 
security of supply. There sustainable, efficient and diverse energy mix along with 
measures to address challenges of global warming is one of the key aspects (Shaffer 131-
132). EU member states that rely on natural gas achieve their environmental goals and 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Ratner et al. 2013:5). 
EU aims to decrease pollution levels, change its fuel mix towards environmental goals, 
promote gas to oil in case of energy efficiency and hereby Azerbaijan with its natural gas 
can ideally help to achieve EU’s goals in the long term. Therefore this thesis will divide 
sustainability to following sections to analyse: firstly EU energy mix and the role of 
natural gas, secondly CO2 trends, and finally IEA predictions of consumption of EU and 
Azerbaijan’s potential trends in gas exports to look how could it affect EU’s need for 
natural gas. 
 
                                                 
2 Article 194 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFUE). 
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2.4. Operationalization of three dimensions 
This thesis will use simple indicators and metrics, instead of complex indicators, that 
presented and collected by Sovacool and Mukherjee in their article “Conceptualizing and 
Measuring Energy Security: A Synthesized Approach” (Sovacool; Mukherjee 2011: 
5347-5352). Their research concluded that there are 320 simple energy indicators and 52 
complex indicators that scholars, researchers and policymakers can use in analysing 
energy security. Also, they divided these indicators into five dimensions and that proves 
how complex a nature energy security analysis can be (Sovacool; Mukherjee 2011:5342). 
As there is no universal approach to measure/assess energy security and it depends on 
authors’ interests and subjects related to the concept, the selection of indicators to be 
implemented depends on the dimension and needs of this particular thesis. One of the 
underlying reasons is that there is a lack of available data to back certain indicators and 
there is no gas trade between EU and Azerbaijan at the moment. 
 
Reliability  
To assess the dependent variable “The fit of Azerbaijan as a potential supplier”, first gas 
must be analysed with its potential as a physical supply. Therefore it is important to 
evaluate diversification in natural gas supply for the EU since diversification is the EU’s 
main tool. Additionally, derived from Shaffer, transit states must be analysed in context 
to avoid interruptions and assessing Azerbaijan's suitability as a potential supplier, while 
also taking into account other diversification options available for the EU with regards to 
their potential reserves of natural gas.  
The domestic consumption of gas will be looked at on a par with the assessment of the 
overall situation, which is generally more relevant to gas trade. Sovacool et al. bring out 
main supplies indicators: total natural gas reserves and reserve-to-production ratio for 
natural gas and self-sufficiency, which takes into account domestic consumption 
(Sovacool; Mukherjee 2011:5347)-5348). Self-sufficiency data with proven reserves 
indicate the latest situation, resource to production ratio (R/P ratio). The data is derived 
from British Petroleum Statistics, which is annually presented to public (British 
Petroleum 2018). Since British Petroleum is operating actively in Azerbaijan, it has to 
provide reliable and updated information every year for investors. The statistical package 
was issued in June 2018 giving an overview of 2017.  
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Affordability 
In the case of EU and gas prices, the volatility and market prices must be considered as 
well as Azerbaijan’s average export price to predict the potential price in the future. 
Sovacool et al. offered indicators for affordability dimension and the following will be 
used in this thesis: market prices for natural gas (also forecast added) and fuel price 
volatility (Sovacool; Mukherjee 2011:5348-5349). Additionally, oil price fluctuation in 
EU will be also looked at, because gas price in Azerbaijan is linked to oil price. The data 
is derived from British Petroleum, World Bank and Eurostat. With regards to 
Azerbaijan’s gas price, Azerbaijan’s Statistical Committee database information on 
average export price is used to evaluate the gas price to EU. 
 
Sustainability 
Sustainability is stated as the most difficult aspect in analysing energy security. Sovacool 
et al. bring out some of the indicators, for example, share of zero-carbon fuels in energy 
mix (renewables share) and total greenhouse gas emissions and CO2 emission (Sovacool; 
Mukherjee 2011:5351). Therefore, analysing EU energy mix together with CO2 emission 
trends will give an overview of ongoing trends and show the role of natural gas. Data is 
collected from Eurostat datasets. 
Also, in order to fit Azerbaijan into the sustainability dimension for the purpose of further 
analysis, IEA forecasts on energy issues of EU must be considered as well as any 
identification of possible trends over the next decades in consumption, trade and 
production of natural gas across the EU. Azerbaijan’s potential will be analysed with the 
focus on the respective production and potential sustainability of gas supplies, while 
taking into account the future forecasts for the EU energy mix changes. The data is 
derived from Eurostat, IEA and British Petroleum. 
The data is reliable and valid. The following statistics stand as primary sources: IEA, 
British Petroleum and Eurostat with European Environmental Agency are being used in 
policy and energy analysis and are dependent. Azerbaijan’s State Statistic on natural gas 
based on SOCAR’s information, which is reliable primarily due to the goal of attracting 
investors by providing them with the right data. 
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Different data surfaces from different organizations on natural gas proven reserves due 
their methods (Oral; Esen 2016:101). Nevertheless, this thesis relies only on British 
Petroleum data on proven reserves and statistics on natural resources physical availability. 
This is because BP is one of the world’s biggest operators and producers of oil and gas 
and the issued statistics is trusted by investors and researchers worldwide.  
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3. Three components of energy security 
 
3.1. Reliability dimension 
The first dimension of the three, reliability, aims to analyse three main components: 
diversification options for EU, the natural gas supply chain from Azerbaijan to EU and 
potential hindering aspects as Russia’s influence in the region and Legal Status of Caspian 
Sea. Finally, Azerbaijan’s outlook for diversification, role as a supplier and natural gas 
profile will be analysed. 
 
3.1.1. Diversification options for European Union 
Diversification in the case of EU means that there is a great need for import gas. As 
European Union imports gas in big volumes then it fits to the importer’s perspective 
where avoiding shortages in energy needs have the main aim of energy security according 
to Proedrou. On the other hand, for exporters energy security equates with security of 
demand which guarantee significant profits, which in this case helps to understand 
Azerbaijan’s role as a supplier for mutual benefit (Proedrou 2012:3). Considering EU 
external approach to diversify their gas dependence from Russia and Energy Security 
Strategy aims, then variety of matters will have a strong share in their external 
communication. Hence, all new relationships, for EU having gas in future rely on 
cooperation and implementing necessary policies in field of energy security. 
The main logic on diversification remains. The increase of natural gas suppliers, 
combined with the increased importance of the commodity in the world, then it suggests 
increase in overall energy security for the states (Cohen et al. 2011:4868). The rise in 
demand for natural gas can see in the rising production levels, where for example in the 
last decades up to 2017, the production is risen from 2940bcm (billion cubic meters) to 
3680bcm (British Petroleum(BP) 2018:28). 
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Figure 1. Extra-EU imports of natural gas, shares (%) of main trading partners in 
2017. Eurostat3 
External suppliers level is rather narrow for the EU. The market is mainly supplied by 
two states natural gas, Russia and Norway, which is almost 4/5 of total import outside the 
EU. Hence the main problem relies on Russia’s import, towards which mainly the whole 
external diversification process is aimed to. Norway on the other hand is well integrated 
to EU market, yet not as a part of EU, Norway shares the same values and contributes to 
the Union and from them the risk of disruption from gas flow to the union seems quite 
low. This thesis will focus on potential pipeline natural gas supplies, therefore Qatar, 
Nigeria is left out, because they focus on LNG due to their geographical situation and are 
main LNG importers to EU based on British Petroleum. To add, Algeria also has LNG 
capability, but it relies strongly on pipeline movements (BP 2018:34). 
Overall, Ratner et.al in their article about alternatives for EU gas bring out the main 
possible suppliers in future. They mention main regions as Caspian and Central Asia 
region (STAN states), North Africa and more distant opportunities in case of Eastern 
Mediterranean region and Arctic (Ratner et al. 2012:18-28).  
In case of other opportunities, Ratner et al. bring an example of another potential source, 
that is in the North. Arctic region has great gas reserves and North Sea holds majority of 
                                                 
3 Eurostat. (2018 October) .EU imports of energy products - recent developments. Retrieved 31.12.2018 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/EU_imports_of_energy_products_-
_recent_developments#Main_suppliers_of_natural_gas_and_petroleum_oils_to_the_EU 
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Norway’s natural gas reserves, but also Russia’s. Authors mention that Arctic region can 
hold up to 25% of undiscovered gas reserves. Still it is in far future exploring these 
reserves it is one of the possible ways for EU natural gas diversification (Ratner et al. 
2012:27-28). Yet, their offered other distant opportunities in case of Cyprus and Israel 
have come true (Ratner et al 2012:27). The new East Mediterranean pipeline agreed with 
capacity of 20bcm/y to supply EU (Staff 2018). Hence, these states are not considered in 
this thesis due to clear progress have been already made towards EU market. Finally, 
Northern area is under exploration and probably would include LNG transportation, yet 
this thesis rely on pipelines and natural gas. 
 
STAN Countries 
Kazakhstan became a net natural gas exporter in 2009 and natural gas is second to oil in 
case of production based on Ratner et al. The further developing of gas fields can have 
alternative export destinations in future. Now their production is mainly aimed towards 
Russia and China. It can be possible in future, that they diversify their partners, but it 
requires huge foreign investments. Still the big dependence on Russia as a partner, 
domestic taxes and political situation rather discourage Western investors to invest in the 
state, but authors claim that there is some potential for future (Ratner et al. 2012:21).  
The main issue for EU is the geographical location. For having long distance supply 
means high transactions costs with long duration of shipping and one concern for EU is 
their unpredictable tariffs, which makes investors to hesitate (Mantel 2015:67). Despite 
the challenges and Russia’s influence, EU continues energy aimed cooperation with 
Kazakhstan, which is the most developed sphere of cooperation between EU and Astana 
(Mantel 2015:63). 
Turkmenistan holds the largest gas reserves in Central Asia and they hold significant 
potential for gas export according to Ratner et al. As Turkmenistan has been searching 
for alternatives from exporting to Russia, it is rather aiming towards east in case of China. 
One of the obstacles is currently still situation of Caspian Sea and standing still Trans-
Caspian Pipeline project, but it gives an motivation towards extra supply and reason to 
develop more Southern Corridor. Still it remains a big question mark relating to 
Turkmenistan real EU orientation (Ratner et al. 2012:22). 
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Considering the vast potential of its gas reserves, then Turkmenistan needs substantial 
investments to increase its production and is becoming more important for Eurasian 
importers (Oral; Esen 2016:105). The main struggle for EU is that Turkmenistan is a 
closed state, is greatly influenced by Russia and market is aimed towards China. Still 
Trans-Caspian Pipeline is possible, but emerging One Belt, One Road initiative from 
China through investments is a real challenge for EU. Other problem is that Turkmen gas 
is less competitive in EU market, because due to the long distance and yet-to-be 
constructed pipeline through Caspian, the transport prices are assumed to be high (Pirani 
2018:14). 
Uzbekistan, what authors refer as a “Sleeping Gaz Giant”, which has huge potential for 
exporting based on Ratner et al. Now they consume mostly their gas production 
domestically and are dependent on Soviet era pipeline systems. Even so Uzbekistan can 
be a potential supplier for EU if its natural gas infrastructure development begins to look 
westward. Ratner et.al say that main Russian origin gas firms as Gazprom and Lukoil are 
largest investors in Uzbekistan, but still their policies rather aim to keep Uzbek gas away 
from competing with Russia’s natural gas to EU (Ratner et al. 2012:22-23). 
Hence, Uzbekistan is a possibility, but from now it seems rather excluded in case of 
diversifying EU gas market. Lack of infrastructure, geographical situation and Russia’s 
influence makes it an option for far future. 
 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
In case of North Africa, Algeria is one of the suppliers for EU but according to Ratner 
et.al then for further gas from the country security issues are main concerns also with 
business climate. As an example, a terrorist attack occurred which ensued hostage crisis 
at a natural gas facility in Algeria in January 2013 (Ratner et al. 2012:2). This situation 
highlighted security concerns that could present a key obstacle to further development in 
natural gas sector. Another factor they bring out is that the domestic consumption may 
outstrip exports within the next decade which have effect on EU (Ratner et al. 2012:24). 
As a third partner for EU in natural gas imports, Algerian role will have important share 
in total imports. Especially considering Southern Europe in future. 
Egypt on the other hand is in the need of reorganization of their gas sector according to 
Ratner et.al. Their natural gas demand has grown annually and due to effects of Arab 
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Spring and resignation of Hosni Mubarak in 2011 the natural gas infrastructure has been 
attacked by terrorist groupings. One of the main issues is and was, that gas fields are 
underdeveloped and pose high price because of the hardly accessible locations which has 
negative impact on investors interests (Ratner et al. 2012:25-26). In 2011 Egypt became 
a natural gas net importer, at the same time gas demand is growing fast in the country, 
but 2020 it plans to become a net exporter of gas due to new discoveries of gas (Ruble 
2017:345). In case of exporting it to EU, first they need to meet their own growing 
domestic demand which was 3.5% growth per year from 2006 to 2016 (BP 2018:29). 
Libya has great gas potential, but due to Arab Spring and security issues it is complicated 
to have gas from the region. In 2011 gas production fell almost 90% in Libya (Ratner et 
al. 2012:25-26). Since then the political situation has been difficult and EU rather looks 
for alternatives, because Arab Spring showed how Southern EU member states energy 
security can be affected. Especially Italy, which domestic consumption depended also on 
Libya’s gas through Greenstream pipeline, which was closed when war in Libya 
intensified (Silva 2017:53). At the current moment 4.4 BCM comes to Italy from Libya 
(BP 2018:34).  
Considering EU pursues toward Iran, then in energy contexts Iran is also considerable 
potential in the region. Iran due its geographical position reaches from Caspian Sea to the 
Persian Gulf and is very rich on energy resources and is ranking in the world’s top list. 
Due to Iran’s energy resources it can be a valuable partner for EU increasing its 
diversification. Still due to Iran’s policy and confrontation with the U.S it hinders the 
outlooks. Thus, Russia and Iran have the same point of view that they are not interested 
increasing U.S presence in the region and same goes on EU. 
Based on Koolaee et.al then U.S relations with Azerbaijan is one of the main concerns 
for Iran. Azerbaijan’s close ties with U.S in economic and military cooperation is seen by 
Iran as a possibility for U.S to attack Iran. Nevertheless, Iran’s relations with Azerbaijan 
has become weaker due to Azerbaijan’s growing relations with Turkey and U.S. Iran role 
as a mediator in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has dissatisfied Azerbaijan due Iran’s 
relations with Armenia. One of the remaining issues regarding Iran’s position in the 
region is the legal status of Caspian Sea (Koolaee; Hafezian 2010:391). Considering that, 
for EU having gas from Caspian region and Iran, then due to Iran’s position on USA, in 
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terms of gas as a potential weapon of influence, then firstly political situation plays role 
and will be first factor, when potential gas import idea may rise for EU.  
 
3.1.2. Supply chain towards EU and concerns 
South Caucasus region has gain more attention after the collapse of Soviet Union and has 
become a strategic frontier for major actors in case of trade links, unresolved conflicts 
and most of all energy resources and security. Black Sea region is a sensitive area due to 
natural resources and geopolitical rivalries (Demiroglu 2015:26).  
Due to the importance of transit states of making it possible for Azerbaijan’s gas to reach 
EU border, then the current situation must be described with potential hindering factors 
as Russia and Legal Status of Caspian Sea. This chapter is divided firstly in describing 
and analysing supply chain in case of Georgia and Turkey; then following Russia’s 
position in the region and finally Legal Status of Caspian Sea. 
 
Southern Gas Corridor 
In 2009, by European Commission initiation and backed Southern Gas Corridor project 
which aimed to diversify Central and South-East European states gas dependence. The 
potential supplies from the Caspian Region, the Middle East and the East Mediterranean 
can be valuable sources for energy diversification. Additionally, EU aims to increase 
Southern Gas Corridor pipelines capacity to 80-100bcm of gas per year in the future. The 
main aims are to negotiate with possible supplier states as Azerbaijan, Iraq and 
Turkmenistan and main transit states as Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia (European 
Commission).  
The Southern Gas Corridor involves four projects 1) Shah Deniz field in Caspian Sea, 2) 
South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) and its extension SCPX from Azerbaijan to Georgia to 
Turkey, 3) Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) through Turkey to Greece and 4) Trans 
Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) through Greece, Albania, Adriatic Sea to Southern Italy. The 
total cost is estimated to be under 40 billion dollars (Elliot; O’Byrne 2018). 
Shah Deniz project involves two phases and are supply source for natural gas. The Shah 
Deniz first phase is capable to produce 10.9bcm/y and 50mbd (thousand barrels per day) 
gas condensate, which is used due to its properties to dilute heavier oils. Shah Deniz phase 
two is aimed to EU market and it is capable producing additionally to Shad Deniz extra 
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16bcm/y natural gas and condensate 105mbd. Shareholders are: BP 28.83% (British 
Petroleum), TPAO 19% (Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı), Petronas 15.50% 
(Malaysian oil and gas company), SOCAR 10% (State Oil Company of Azerbaijan 
Republic), Lukoil: 10% (Russian oil and gas company),NICO 10% (a Swiss-based 
subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Company), SGC 6.67% (“Southern Gas Corridor” 
Closed Joint-Stock Company owned by Azerbaijan state 51% and 49% SOCAR) 
(Southern Gas Corridor website). 
Second project is South Caucasus Pipeline and its extension via Azerbaijan and Georgia 
to Turkish border. The annual transportation capacity is for South Caucasus Pipeline 
7.41bcm and extension with gives it total 23.4bcm/y, which can be expanded to 31bcm/y 
if there is a need. The total length is for South Caucasus pipeline 642km and extension 
adds 489km. The main shareholders are same as Shah Deniz project: BP 28.83%; TPAO 
19%; Petronas 15.50%; SOCAR 10%; Lukoil 10%; NICO 10%; SGC: 6.67% (Southern 
Gas Corridor website). 
 
 
Figure 2. Southern Gas Corridor. Trans-Adriatic Pipeline homepage4 
 
                                                 
4 Map picture from Trans Adriatic Pipeline project homepage. Southern Gas Corridor. Retrieved on 
09.05.2018 https://www.tap-ag.com/the-pipeline/the-big-picture/southern-gas-corridor 
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The third project is TANAP as Trans Anatolian Pipeline with a total of length 1345 km 
to reach Turkey-Greece border from Georgian border. The transportation capacity will be 
16.2bcm/y but can be extended to 30.7bcm/y. The main shareholders are: SGC 51%; 
BOTAS 30% (Turkish national oil and gas Corporation); BP 12%; STEAS 7% (SOCAR 
Turkey Enerji AS) (Southern Gas Corridor website). TANAP as the longest pipeline link 
in Southern Gas Corridor project is owed mostly by Azerbaijan and SOCAR, total 58%. 
TAP as Trans Adriatic pipeline transportation capacity will be firstly 10bcm/y and can be 
expanded to 20bcm/y. Total length from Greece to Italy via Albania and through Adriatic 
Sea is 878 km. The main shareholders are: BP 20%; SGC 20%; SNAM 20% (Italian 
natural gas company); FLUXYS 19% (Belgium based gas company); ENAGAS 16% 
(Spanish energy company); AXPO 5% (Swiss based energy company) (Southern Gas 
Corridor website). 
As seen from shareholders amount, Southern Gas Corridor is a global project backed up 
by international and state-owned energy firms. When we consider state ownership, then 
main control is owned by Azerbaijan government through SOCAR shares and SGC 
(Azerbaijan Government with SOCAR) shares. At the same time, they are taking a huge 
responsibility for selling their gas to EU market, yet unknowing the uncertainty of future 
gas prices in EU. Additionally, Turkey’s government through BOTAS has supported the 
pipeline project TANAP, yet still SGP hold majority there with STEAS 58% which gives 
majority in decision process. These two states interest are reflected the most, because they 
are main benefit gainers in the project. Turkey becoming a gas hub and serving its 
domestic need, while Azerbaijan wants to escape free from landlocked state status in 
terms of natural gas.  
European companies are presented and mainly by British Petroleum in all stages, who 
has been operating in Azerbaijan for decades. As major EU companies interest is to serve 
profit and earn back their investment. Since energy companies contribute by billions with 
Southern Gas Corridor project, then also home states of the firms are interested due to 
potential profit driving their economies. This also can have effect on diversification and 
cooperation by EU side. Yet firstly Azerbaijan’s natural gas reserves will mostly affect 
Southern-Eastern European states energy market due to the location and gas pipeline 
systems connectivity. 
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Georgia 
Georgia is making progress towards EU, which is its largest trading partner based on 
European Union External Service. In 2016 EU-Georgia Association Agreement entered 
into force and Georgia has also entered in Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
(DCFTA). Even so, Georgia has some issues regarding their ambitions to join EU and 
NATO. One of the main reasons are breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
EU remains firmly committed to its policy of supporting Georgia’s territorial integrity 
(European External Action Service (a)). On the other hand, despite the cooperation, 
Georgia’s territorial integrity is complicated due to disputed areas and relations between 
Russia and Georgia, which turned to short term war in 2008 august. One of the factors of 
the attacks in 2008 was Georgia’s attempts to sell natural gas to European markets 
through providing transit and it lead Russia to support South Ossetian breakaway region 
(Shaffer 2009:42). Since Russia’s influence strongly relies on natural gas, then all kind 
of progress towards EU and pro-Western relations from the previous Soviet Union 
member states can weaken Moscow’s political goals and through influence it tries to 
balance the situation and maintain the position. 
Based on Demiroglu, Georgia’s foreign policy follows pro-Western and aims to enter 
Western institutions. Additionally, they present clear interest towards NATO and EU. In 
2006, when explosion on Mozdok-Tbilisi gas pipeline in Russia’s North Caucasus region 
occurred, showed to Georgia, how dependent it is on Russia’s energy. In case of 
transporting gas to EU, Georgia has become a transit state when Azerbaijan tries to re-
route gas from Russia to EU market. South Caucasus pipeline gives a substantial asset to 
their economy which helps them to decrease dependence from Russia (Demiroglu 
2015:28). 
One of the solutions from decreasing dependence from Russia has been cooperation with 
Azerbaijan, especially on natural resources like gas and oil. Based on Shaffer, then transit 
states can have benefit for their self-interests. Georgia and Azerbaijan are taking part in 
NATO’s Partnership for Peace program and they have been developing further transit 
frameworks through cooperation to increase each other’s stability and prosperity. The one 
case is that to reach EU and Turkey’s market, Azerbaijan sells natural gas for Georgian 
market with extremely low rates. This on the other hand increases their mutual 
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dependence from each other and cooperation is necessary element for having 
Azerbaijan’s gas (Shaffer 2009:41). 
Georgia will remain important figure as a transit state both for Azerbaijan and European 
Union. The potential expanding of gas supply from Caspian Sea makes firstly Azerbaijan 
to continue friendly relationship with Georgia and secondly EU needs to continue 
cooperation and peace promotion to avoid escalation in Georgia over disputed areas under 
Russia’s influence to avoid potential escalations and disruptions on gas. 
 
Turkey 
Turkey has important strategical and advantageous geographical position in the Eurasia. 
According to Demiroglu then Turkey has become a major energy hub in the world. Due 
to its location Turkey is in the middle of energy rich states. From one side is Middle 
Eastern countries, then Russia and Central Asian countries and also borders the high 
consumer as EU. He mentions that Turkey’s energy policy goals are to secure, diversify 
and stabilize energy transport routes and in annually nearly 6-7% of world’s oil supply 
passes its territory. Being a transit state is also beneficial for economic perspectives. In 
case of EU, then Turkey has a very strategic value for bypassing Russia and having 
Azerbaijan’s gas (Demiroglu 2015:27-28).  
However, for being a transit state towards EU then Turkey must at first meet domestic 
natural gas demand. Currently Turkey imports about 75% of their total energy need, half 
of the coal it uses as a solid fuel and almost all its oil and gas need according to Austvik 
and Rzayeva They add, that Turkey is interested in long term contracts related to gas 
import which include large volumes of gas. Due to their ambitions they increase LNG 
share in the market and negotiates with Middle Eastern countries for increasing and 
developing related infrastructure. The main policy goal is to increase their gas related 
capabilities (Austvik, Rzayeva 2017:540-543). 
While Turkey is a member state of NATO, then their strategy is to balance geopolitical 
situation because their scope of interests as a consumer and as a transit country has main 
role in politics. EU dependency, according to Austvik and Rzayeva, on natural gas in case 
of Turkey may influence their relations bilaterally. Failed coup in 2016 initiated the 
president of Turkey to strengthening the institutions of the Presidency and bolstering 
civilian control over military. They also add that Turkey faces with their current Kurdish 
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issues which may hinder the claims for becoming international gas hub (Austvik, Rzayeva 
2017:546). 
Turkey as a transit state understands its potential as being a gas hub due to its strategical 
location. For an example, EU sees Turkey potential to absorb Northern Iraq gas 
additionally to Azerbaijan gas to further supply EU market (European Commission 
2014(c):47).  Firstly, this is also an option to meet its natural gas demand and economic 
growth, but on the other hand EU will be more dependent on supplies that are coming 
from Turkey. In case of Turkey to use gas as a weapon of influence seems to be less 
likely, because they have interests placed to Southern Gas Corridor project through 
national firm of BOTAS, which means high incomes for providing gas to EU. One factor 
comes out in energy field, that reputation also matters, which affects investors interests 
and their investment safe atmosphere. 
 
Legal Status of the Caspian Sea as a potential threat to reliability 
The Caspian Sea legal status plays a great role in future energy landscape related to 
Caspian region and gas potential. Moreover, it is the largest inland water body in the 
world with five littoral states Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Russia. 
Additionally, in case of energy exploration, then the seabed holds great amount of energy 
resources and all littoral states want to have their share and influence. The hindering factor 
is that that it is called as a sea, but there is no connection to oceans. As being inner land 
water body, then having resources from the sea needs all littoral states consensus. 
According to Boban and Lončar, Caspian Sea represents itself an opportunity to realize 
economic growth and strengthen political power. Caspian basin is estimated to contain 
48 billion barrels of oil and 292 billion cubic meters of natural gas. The problems started 
when Soviet Union Collapsed and Caspian Sea was not anymore bordered by two, but 
five littoral states. The question if it is lake or sea has great meaning. If the status of the 
water body is defined as sea, then the resources and water border would be regulated by 
United Nations Convention on the Seas. In that case the Caspian Sea would be open to 
littoral states and for multinational corporations on energy field. Additionally, they bring 
out that if the status would be defined as a lake, then waters and resources should be 
divided by the five states and it makes them not open to international community in their 
opinion (Boban, Lončar 2016:81-83).  
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Figure 3. Caspian Sea littoral states with sea division. Oil and Gas Journal5 
 
Kazakhstan has the largest share of Caspian Sea and they have largest oil reserves also 
based on Pannier. Azerbaijan continues developing and exploring its coast and main aim 
is on Shah Deniz fields. Iran on the other hand is one of the poorest in case of oil and gas 
in their share of Caspian, where water is saltier in their section which makes difficult for 
getting gas in technical reasons. In the end of 2017 meeting with the foreign ministers of 
five littoral states took place. Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, claimed that they have 
found solutions to all issues regarding to the legal status of the Caspian and agreement 
should be signed in the first half of 2018 in Astana where Caspian Summit takes place. 
This means that idea for Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP) will be possible between 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, but on the other hand 2018 Turkmenistan and Russia were 
discussing cooperation on production and sale of Turkmen gas to Eastern Europe and CIS 
countries which can danger the TCP (Pannier 2017). Additionally, the Convention on 
                                                 
5 Map picture from Mammadov, Q. (2015) Turkmenistan Positions itself as a natural gas power. In Oil and 
Gas Journal. Retrieved 12.05.2018. https://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-113/issue-
12/transportation/turkmenistan-positions-itself-as-eurasian-natural-gas-power.html 
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Legal Status of Caspian Sea was signed by all five littoral states, but from Iran’s 
perspective there are still unsolved matters on territory and excluding foreign military 
presence referring on US cargo shipments from Azerbaijan to Kazakhstan (Pannier 2018). 
From the Iran’s perspective it is understandable, because it has the smallest share of 
Caspian Sea, while back at Soviet times it was divided by half and their influence over 
sea was higher. Yet, still TCP is under question and time will show, what will be 
Turkmenistan’s motivations towards EU, where they aim to sell their huge amount of gas, 
which is the main income source for them. Hence, when there is no final consensus 
between littoral states on sea borders and use of the sea, then still Caspian Legal status 
must be considered. 
 
Russia’s role in the region 
For Russia, Azerbaijan is the most important state in the region and the influence over 
Caucasus largely depend on its influence over Azerbaijan based on Demiroglu. Due to 
Azerbaijan’s strategic location bordering Georgia and Armenia, then maritime roads to 
Central Asia and bordering the Middle East in case of Iran. Since the collapse of Soviet 
Union Russia still considers Azerbaijan in their interest sphere. While the Caucasus has 
the strategic value in connecting it with the West, Russia rather aims to plug up this 
corridor in the aim of making it as a dead end for Western pursues to develop their security 
presence and related infrastructure. Energy is seen as a main policy tool over the region 
and also one way to have control over EU (Demiroglu 2015:26-27).  
According to Demiroglu, the Russian policy concerning South Caucasus has following 
main aspects: Russia’s control over the production and export; holding a monopoly on 
acquiring gas at cheap price from the region; increasing dominance over European 
consumer markets and finally utilizing dominance over both the import from and export 
to Common Wealth of Independent States (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Armenia, Moldova, Russia itself, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) countries of gas for political 
purposes. He adds that Russia is increasingly capitalizing on energy in case of the less 
fungible commodity which is natural gas. According to him, the Russia’s plan is clear, 
which include dominating Eurasian energy to have effect on European Union. Not to 
mention Russia has been blatant to use energy, gas specially, as a political tool over 
former Soviet states of which some are now members of EU (Demiroglu 2015:27). 
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Gazprom as one of the main exporter to EU provided 178bcm of natural gas in 2016 and 
192bcm in 2017 to EU (Gazprom). Gazprom as giant gas firm has become effective policy 
tool for Russia. In case of Azerbaijan, Russia is not interested that Azerbaijan would 
export their natural gas to EU without that it goes through Russia’s territory or excluding 
Gazprom owned pipelines. Russia also tries to grow its influence through energy in 
Azerbaijan also and new deals may be warnings to EU. While Azerbaijan’s domestic need 
for developing gas production is till in work then Gazprom gas deal was signed in 2017. 
The aim of the gas deal was to test the gas storages in Azerbaijan which were 3.5 billion 
cubic meters in total and supply the market (Azernews).  
The emergence of Russia’s Gazprom to Azerbaijan’s market means growing influence 
over Baku. Azerbaijan’s gas production is aimed to foreign markets, but increasing 
domestic demand left no choice to have Russia’s gas, because Azerbaijan must fulfil 
export promises to contract states. 
 
3.1.3. Reliability of Azerbaijan 
 
Azerbaijan as most desirable option for diversification 
Azerbaijan has promising outlook for long term natural gas cooperation with the EU. 
Based on Ratner et al, from there it is possible to access to other gas suppliers also in 
Caucasus and Central Asia to meet the EU gas consumption need in future. Ratner et al. 
claims that Azerbaijan can be the “best hope” for diversifying gas in future. In their view, 
developing main gas fields in Azerbaijan will give a strong base of resource for Southern 
Corridor and possible future growths (Ratner et al: 2012:20-21). The possible future 
growth of Caspian gas is optimistic, because in case of MENA states, which are still 
affected or recovering from Arab Spring makes EU investors to be careful and think twice 
for further investments. 
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Table 1. Proven Natural Gas Reserves in trillion cubic meters. British Petroleum6 
State 2017 (tcm) 
Azerbaijan 1,3 
Kazakhstan 1,1 
Turkmenistan 19,5 
Uzbekistan 1,2 
Algeria 4,3 
Iran 33,2 
Libya 1,4 
Egypt 1,8 
 
In case of potential diversification plans for EU, cooperation with Azerbaijan can offer 
positive results. Considering potential in case of MENA states, where political situation 
is rather complicated and security threat is high, their proven resources number clearly 
are left behind of Caspian Region potential. Firstly, there is ongoing Southern Corridor 
Project in progress to link the region with European Market. Secondly the potential of 
Turkmenistan gas remains an option, if there will be positive dialog forwards leading to 
TCP. Thirdly, Iran has the largest amount of gas, and it may be an option for future, 
depending highly on politics between USA and Iran.  
In case of cooperation, there is seen an opportunity for EU increasing dependence from 
Russia by bringing new gas supplies to the market with future potential given by the 
Caspian region. The creation of Southern Gas Corridor does not mean that Azerbaijan 
will be the end supplier because it can be expanded for diversification if the ground is 
suitable and the demand is high. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 British Petroleum (2018). Total Proven Natural Gas Reserves. pp 26. Retrieved 31.12.2018 
https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/en/corporate/pdf/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-
review-2018-natural-gas.pdf  
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Azerbaijan as a supplier 
Azerbaijan geographically is situated in Europe, South Caucasus state and littoral state of 
Caspian Sea. The Republic of Azerbaijan was declared in 1991 due to collapse of Soviet 
Union at the same time with Georgia and Armenia. It shares border with Turkey, Russia, 
Iran, Georgia and Armenia also. As Azerbaijan is surrounded by local three 
“superpowers” in case of Turkey, Iran and Russia, then Azerbaijani foreign policy is 
balanced and avoids taking sides. Azerbaijanis sometimes refer to themselves as a buffer 
zone state between Russia-Iran and Russia-Turkey.  
The role of energy resources cannot be unnoticed in case of Azerbaijan. According to 
Nuriyev, this is one of the main factors consolidating their independence through decades. 
Also, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project with Baku-Supsa helped them to strengthen 
their position in the region. One aspect, which has been important for Azerbaijan is 
strengthening US-Azerbaijan ties. It helped to open cooperation towards EU in case of 
France, Germany and UK (Nuriyev 2010:2).  
In case of EU, then Azerbaijan has strong economic relations with the union. The EU is 
Azerbaijan’s biggest export and import market with 60% and 31% share in Azerbaijan’s 
total volumes. Since 2004 Azerbaijan has been added to European Neighborhood Policy 
program and also in 2009 to Eastern Neighborhood initiative (European External Action 
Service(b)). It shows that EU is actively coordinating its policy and trying also to promote 
EU values as economic reforms, democratic development and integrate them to their 
market model through cooperation. 
Based on Anar Valiyev, the main cooperation aim is deeper political cooperation and to 
establish closer relationship with Azerbaijan which can stretch beyond economic 
integration. On the other hand, according to Valiyev, then BREXIT referendum 2016 
impacted the Azerbaijan’s perception regarding future cooperation with EU. While UK 
has been promoter in different pipeline projects and it is one of the major investors in 
Azerbaijan, then in future it can be difficult to have same level support as before from the 
EU. That could shift their interest of further integration (Valiyev 2018:131-132).  
Due to Azerbaijan’s geographical position it is open to three major integration initiatives 
like European Union, Eurasian Economic Union and One Belt One Road. Additionally, 
Valiyev says that it is hard to imagine Azerbaijan abandoning pro-European development 
and one of the reason is Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijan need a balancing power against 
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Russia’s growing interest in the region and pro-Kremlin Armenia in fear the fate of 
Ukraine (Valiyev 2018:144-145). 
The relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan has been one of the main issues in the 
region. While the population of Armenia is three million people, then compared to 
Azerbaijan they have large Armenian Diaspora which supports Armenia’s interests and 
also gives a considerable financial support to the state. Not only… but also Armenia is 
considered as a last loyal ally for Russia in South-Caucasus which reflect from their 
positive relations (Demiroglu 2015:28). 
While Azerbaijan owns a lot of natural resources in case of oil and gas, at the same time 
consisting a great share in GDP, then Armenia is not so rich by resources. 2016 estimated 
GDP for Armenia was 26 billion dollars and the share of expenditures on military was 
4,1% (CIA World Factbook). Azerbaijan on the other hand had almost 40 billion dollars 
of GDP, which of 3,6% was spent on military (CIA World Factbook (a)). It shows the 
power and capability contrast between these states while giving Azerbaijan a stronger 
position, yet Armenia has friendly ties with Russia. 
The ongoing situation in Nagorno-Karabakh has been a key issue since end of 1980s. 
There has been lack of progress if any. The current situation seems to continue on the 
same line as previous years. In terms of gas, escalation of the conflict can give severe 
impact on Azerbaijan’s pursues to transport gas to EU. Also, EU face great confrontation 
with Russia in the region and Armenia is rather pro-Kremlin as previously mentioned 
being part of Eurasian Economic Union. Therefore, for EU it is important to continue 
conflict resolution to increase its influence in the region and Southern Gas Corridor can 
be a source of influence and cooperation with in the Caspian region. 
 
Azerbaijan: natural gas profile 
Azerbaijan has a long history in hydrocarbon production based on Rzayeva. As 
historically Azerbaijan has been known for producing oil, being first state in the world to 
start industrially oil exploration in 1847 when they successfully drilled first oil well and 
exceeding U.S, which drilled first one in their soil in Pennsylvania 1860. Azerbaijan was 
one of the main suppliers of Soviet Union through the time of existence and on the period 
of Second World War it provided 75% of Soviet Union’s oil need. The gas production 
started in the beginning of 20th century and was quite modest, but through the century it 
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has been rising due to new technology and exploring new reserves in Caspian basin 
(Rzayeva 2015:4-6). 
While the oil has become main export article over a time, Azerbaijan needs to find new 
sources to export. One of the main reasons is that oil starts to run out slowly due to its 
long time exploiting since 19. century. Currently Azerbaijan has about 7 billion barrels 
proven oil reserves based on and has 0.7% share of global proven oil reserves based on 
British Petroleum. Within the last two decades there have not been discovered new oil 
fields that would be affordable to pursue and export with current technology. The 
resources to production ratio (R/P) estimates, that Azerbaijan will have 24,1 years left 
when oil supplies will run out with current tempo of production (BP 2018:12). Currently 
they are producing 795 thousand barrels per day, but it has been decreasing since 2010, 
when they produced about 1037 thousand barrels per day (BP 2018:12). This gives a good 
opportunity for gas to maintain their position as energy exporter and give some certainty 
to their long-term economic situation. 
The natural gas as a rescue option for their economy cannot be underestimated. Since 
1997 Azerbaijan’s natural gas proven reserves have almost been doubled from 0.7bcm to 
1.3tcm (trillion cubic meters), which is 0.7% of global total share of natural gas proven 
reserves (BP 2018:26). Due the reason, that over time the technology in energy sector has 
improved and now it is possible to have gas from underwater reserves through deep drill 
holes. Considering the Shah Deniz shareholders, as mentioned before, then due to high 
gas potential Azerbaijan attracts investors and big multinational energy companies and 
further exploration in case of gas reserves their interest towards Azerbaijan can increase. 
Additionally, R/P ratio for Azerbaijan is 74.4 year based on current production (BP 
2018:26). Hence production has been growing and periods 2006-2016 annual growth per 
annum was about 10.7%, but in 2017 it slightly decreased to 17.7bcm/y, which is related 
to low oil prices at the period (BP 2018:28). In case of production, domestic consumption 
must be also considered as self-sufficiency. Azerbaijan consumed about 10.6bcm of 
natural gas and domestic need for natural gas increases almost 1% per year considering 
2006-2016 consumption patterns (BP 2018:29).  
Azerbaijan total export of natural gas in 2017 was 8.9bcm, from which it exported 6.3 to 
Turkey’s market and 2.1 to Georgia, yet 0.6bcm was exported to Iran (BP 2018:34). To 
give a comparison moment, then Russian Federation total export volume was 215.4bcm 
49 
 
of which 189.3 was aimed to EU market (BP 2018:34). Additionally, if we compare 
Azerbaijan’s domestic consumption, production and export, then 1.8bcm natural gas must 
be at least imported to fulfil all needs and obligations. This gas is provided by Gazprom. 
While Azerbaijan’s capability to export is low at the current moment, extensions for 
Southern Gas Corridor pipelines are possible and it can increase their export in future. 
Even when the corridor is finished and first 10bcm of gas is imported by TAP to EU’s 
market in 2020 as expected, from total gas consumption it would be between 2-3%, if 
total consumption in EU was about 467bcm/y (BP Statistics) 
Considering that, it still serves EU and Azerbaijan’s cooperation as noteworthy and would 
give a positive touch on energy security in general. These almost 2-3% would mean firstly 
as an achievement to open new supplier states opportunities for European Union.  
 
Concluding remarks on Reliability dimension 
Considering the EU’s diversity projects, Azerbaijan appears to be the most promising 
one. Existing possibilities and MENA states serve their purpose, but further expansion on 
gas supply due to high disruption risk makes the EU to look further into the Caspian 
region. STAN states are still considered as potential sources of supply, but they are more 
susceptible to Russia’s influence, as geographical, technological situation leads them to 
lean towards China or continuing commercial relationship with Russia. Azerbaijan, on 
the other hand, has clearly committed itself towards the EU market and cooperation 
prospects seem to be high for future. 
Considering supply chain and possible negative impacts, Azerbaijan’s gas supply may be 
affected mostly by an external actor. While Azerbaijan also imports natural gas from 
Gazprom, then it future by increasing production they could supply their own demand. In 
case of Azerbaijan’s energy profile, R/P shows long perspective for export, but, notably, 
when volumes will increase, then the ratio will fall. Yet, there are still gas fields to 
discover, probably proven gas amount will increase and outlooks for exports are positive. 
Also, considering the location, Azerbaijan is rather a buffer zone between Iran, Turkey 
and Russia which makes it to choose carefully their politics and strategy. Georgia, on the 
other hand, due to its occupied territories can have serious disruption impact in the supply 
chain. Therefore, EU continues promoting its values and integration towards Georgia. On 
the other hand, Azerbaijan keeps positive relations through low rate gas prices to 
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Georgian market which makes Georgia’s interest to be a transit state. In the meantime, 
Turkey seems to be a reliable transit state because it wants to become a gas hub and 
increase its influence in the region.  
Importantly, Russia stands as an unpredictable actor, and in case of tensions and 
contradictions with its interests, it can cause negative effects on transit and influence over 
STAN states makes it unlikely to have extra gas on the EU market without using Russia’s 
gas network. Finally, while Caspian legal status seems to be solved, yet there remain acute 
questions posed by the situation with Iran, therefore, the issue remains somewhat open. 
Based on IPE liberal approach, then in case of transit and reliability, company importance 
is high together with states. It is well seen on SOCAR’s role in investing together with 
the government through SGC. This is also serves IPE assumption, that privatization of 
utilities seen desirable and the total supply chain is not controlled by one actor (Van de 
Graaf et. al 2016:15). The whole Southern Gas Project is aimed towards liberalizing 
energy market in EU and it creates further interdependence also between transit states, 
who have economic gains in the game. 
The conducted analysis suggests that cooperative bilateral relationship is likely to 
continue between the EU and Azerbaijan in the case of natural gas, and while other 
spheres of cooperation may not be so strong with some inevitable frictions, increasing 
needs for energy diversification will eventually overcome them. Through that, future 
possible interdependence in energy sector, in liberal IPE perspective, can lower the 
potential risks in the future, and through Southern Gas Corridor, stronger EU interests 
will be represented in the region. Yet total perfect interrupted supply scenario cannot be 
reached in case of reliability, because there are a lot of factors, that can be potential risk 
for supply. 
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3.2. Affordability dimension 
The affordability dimension on evaluating energy security has always been as one of the 
main components and in case of EU, IPE liberal approach is seen through free market. 
Globalized world’s energy market shapes the oil and gas prices for customers and states 
energy prices are main drivers for economies. Therefore, this chapter on Azerbaijan’s gas 
affordability and EU’s gas prices looks into whether Caspian gas has potential on EU 
market in case of Azerbaijan’s gas. Yet, since there is no gas trade between EU and 
Azerbaijan, volatility of gas prices looked with consumption patterns of oil and gas. The 
aim is to find out, if gas is more preferred or not and what impact would it have on EU 
states. Also, Azerbaijan’s export price for gas is taken to account to see volatility and 
hypothetical future price. 
 
3.2.1. The volatility of energy prices in EU  
In European Union liberalized market, natural gas price on market depends on demand 
and on market trade. The three EU natural gas trading spot gas platforms prices and 
indicators are usually considered. They are Average German Import Price for natural gas 
(AGIP), UK National Balancing Point (NBP) on natural gas price, and Netherlands Title 
Transfer Facility (TTF) on virtual trading on gas. One of the reasons that these price 
indicators are chosen is due to these states position in EU in case of natural gas. Based on 
British Petroleum, then Netherlands and UK are biggest producers of natural gas in EU 
(not considering Norway) and Germany is biggest importer of natural gas due to their 
economy, hence their own production in 2017 was 6.4bcm/y and it has fallen twice since 
2007 15bcm/y. UK produces 41.9bcm/y and Netherlands 36.6bcm/y and NBP and TTF 
indicators reflect the spot gas trade in main EU hubs (BP 2018:28-29). 
In more specific, natural gas trading on market depends is based on million British 
thermal units (m/Btu). The logic behind shows how much gas is possible to convert to 
heating energy and one cubic meter of natural gas is around 28 m/Btu-s. It depends on 
converting and different energy information providers convert is differently, but in the 
same magnitude, but decimal points differ. Additionally, in EU natural gas is mainly used 
by domestic consumers and industrial consumers first hand focus on generating 
electricity. 
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When we compare oil and gas, then these two commodities are highly dependent of each 
other pricings on global market. We can see the same increases and decreases on both 
price trends.  
In case of gas, then it is same volatile as oil price. In 2009 one m/Btu was almost 5$, yet 
Germany’s AGIP was higher due to strong dependence from Gazprom and supply routes, 
from who it imports half of its natural gas (BP 2018:33). Previously, before 2009 high 
price was also affected by Moscow’s winter energy conflicts in 2006, 2007 winters with 
Belarus, Georgia and Ukraine, which spurred Europe gas markets (Shaffer 2009:161). 
After 2012, when Nord Stream from Russia to Germany was fully operational, the AGIP 
price started to close to TTF and NBP prices and since 2016 it has been cheaper than 
others. On the other hand, total natural gas price volatility has been high. In the 2016 was 
twice cheaper than in 2013, when price was around 10$. 
 
 
Figure 4. Natural Gas Trading Prices: British Petroleum7 
 
                                                 
7
 Data derived from British Petroleum Statistics. Natural gas trading prices. Retreived 31.12.2018 
https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/energy-charting-tool-desktop.html 
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Figure 5. Oil trading price. British Petroleum8 
In case of oil then the prices, then two main indexes affecting showing global prices was 
chosen. Dubai price in case of United Arab Emirates and Brent index related to North Sea 
oil and London prices. Compared with natural gas, volatility since 2009 has been higher 
when in 2012 was about 110$ per barrel and in 2016 it was Dubai 109$ per barrel and 
111$ Brent per barrel (BP 2018:20). The price shift was almost three times, while gas 
price shift was two. In this scenario, assumption can be made, that natural gas price 
fluctuated less than oil, but on the other hand still their prices are strongly connected on 
global market.  
The global market prices have also impact on consumption. The consumption table 
reflects oil consumption in millions of tons and gas consumption in millions of tons oil 
equivalent. Considering the high prices on oil and gas from the rise to the fall 2010-2014, 
then bottom in 2014 was reached based on current time gap. The natural gas did the 
biggest fall, from 447Mtoe in 2010 to 344Mtoe in 2014 and the oil from 664Mt to 592Mt 
(BP Statistics). After 2014 towards 2017 and after both have raised, but natural gas usage 
is raising faster as 57Mtoe compared oils 32Mt, which indicates to the growing usage of 
natural gas instead of oil in EU. 
                                                 
8 Data derived from British Petroleum Statistics. Oil trading prices. Retreived 31.12.2018 
https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/energy-charting-tool-desktop.html 
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While the demand has grown, it means in free market rules, that price will also rise. 
Considering that, World Bank forecast on commodity prices will predict the growth. The 
forecast shows that from 2018 and in the beginning gas price will continue growth but 
after will decline until 2020 and reaches 7$/mbtu. From 2020 it will continue the growth 
steadily, reaching 7.5$/mbtu by 2025 and will be about 8$/mbtu in 2030. Hence, it must 
be considered, that forecast is done in 2018 October, and reflected that moment’s 
conditions for forecast model, which from producer perspective are rather positive than 
negative (World Bank 2018:1). 
 
 
 
Table 6. Oil and gas consumption in EU. Source British Petroleum9 
 
3.2.2. Azerbaijan’s gas affordability 
Azerbaijan through the last decade has advanced in producing gas in values. The future 
aim to sell gas EU’s free market, which follows liberal model based on demand and offer, 
then Azerbaijan’s potential price for the single market must be considered. Yet, there is 
no current trade in natural gas and transport prices are unknown, still it is possible to give 
approximate evaluation to potential gas prices and compare it to EU price trends. 
                                                 
9 Data derived from British Petroleum Statistics. Oil and gas consumption in EU. Retreived 31.12.2018 
https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/energy-charting-tool-desktop.html 
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Current data base on export quantity and earnings on natural gas in Azerbaijan. This data 
reflect export to the main trading partners, which are Turkey, Georgia and Iran (BP 
2018:34). From the prices it can be seen, that they depend on oil price volatility and global 
market prices. Yet Azerbaijan’s gas prices do not show so high volatilities as EU gas 
markets present with their periodical ups and downs. Yet, it must be said that certain 
transport fees are unknow and there will be continues struggle, because in case of low gas 
prices, the long distance natural gas transportation from deep-seabed makes it hard to 
compete on EU South-Eastern gas market (Hall 2018). 
 
Table 2. Azerbaijan’s natural gas export price and quantity. The State Statistical 
Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan10 
Year Million m3 Million $ $/1000 m3  $/m3 11Price m/btu $ 
2009 671,7 125,3 186,57 0,19 5,32 
2010 1 792,9 288,5 160,94 0,16 4,59 
2011 2 885,8 574,6 199,10 0,20 5,68 
2012 2 714,0 648,7 239,03 0,24 6,82 
2013 3 035,1 702,0 231,29 0,23 6,60 
2014 1 825,7 304,7 166,89 0,17 4,76 
2015 8 432,7 1 505,0 178,47 0,18 5,09 
2016 8 396,0 1 096,7 130,62 0,13 3,73 
2017 7 543,5 1 193,7 158,24 0,16 4,51 
 
Additionally, the Southern Corridor’s gas through TAP leading to Italy will affect mostly 
on Southern-Eastern Europe. Yet in case of diversification and free market principles, it 
would serve EU’s aim to reduce the Russia’s gas share in given area states. For example, 
especially in case of Greece, Bulgaria and Italy would have effect on Southern Gas 
Corridor. In Greece, the dependence share of Russia’s gas imports is between 50-75%, 
                                                 
10 Data derived from The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Dynamics of main 
commodities export: natural gas export quantity and price. Retrieved 31.12.2018 
https://www.stat.gov.az/source/trade/en/f_trade/xt009_2en.xls. 
https://www.stat.gov.az/source/trade/?lang=en 
11 Calculation is based on million British thermal units=28,52m3. Retreived 31.12.2018 from 
https://www.convert-me.com/en/convert/energy/mymmbtu.html?u=mymmbtu&v=1  
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Bulgaria 75-100% and Italy 25-50% (Eurostat 2018:9). Based on European Commission 
gas market report, then estimated second quarter of 2018 natural gas cost for domestic 
users is 6.44€/kWh and for industrial consumers 2.35€/kWh. In case of Bulgaria, gas 
price is on average level or low, for industrial consumers it is 2.04€/kWh and domestic 
3.95€/kwh. Greece has domestic estimated price about 5.77€/kWh and one of the highest 
industrial price 2,77€/kWh. On the other hand in Italy, domestic users price is one of the 
highest in EU 8.89€/kWh and industrial is below average 2,27€kWh (European 
Commission 2018(a):30-31).  
Considering Azerbaijan’s current export prices, then the price on EU market will depend 
on oil and gas prices. Yet, Southern Gas Corridor project gives a good opportunity for 
extra diversification on gas market and specially in South-Eastern Europe. 
 
Concluding discussion on Affordability dimension 
The growing consumption of gas compared to oil and low prices makes EU to have 
greater benefit, because Azerbaijan takes a risk being a supplier, but outlooks for it are 
positive based on World Bank forecast. While the taken commitment to provide first 
10bcm/y to EU market, then despite the prices, it must be done by contracts, that usually 
bind suppliers and distributors of gas. It serves EU political goals to fewer dependence 
from Russia’s gas in Southern-Eastern Europe and make gas market more liberalized and 
competitive through Azerbaijan’s gas and is related to competitiveness dimension in EU 
energy triangle. 
In case of EU, then IPE liberal approach, which claims that politics and economics are 
separated, will be suitable. (Van de Graaf et al. 2016:15). The entrance to free market 
means, that market design the price, if there are other suppliers also. Hence, through 
energy trade on suitable prices, it will increase the potential interdependence on energy 
level between EU and Azerbaijan. 
In case of cooperation, then affordability makes Azerbaijan and EU more interdependent, 
yet Azerbaijan is more dependent on EU as it wants to sell gas and potentially grow the 
volumes. EU on the other hand want to increase the functioning of free market to make it 
more competitive and further cooperation is high, especially when main aim is to promote 
low-carbon economies and lowering energy prices for consumers. Considering also the 
price of Southern Gas Corridor, which costs almost 40 billion dollars, then it also gives a 
57 
 
beneficial boost for economy in total. This can be seen on EC’s vice president’s Maroš 
Šefčovič’s speech, who is currently in charge of the Energy Union: “…it will bring 
significant benefits to its host, transit and destination countries, including their local 
communities – in terms of investment, jobs as well as lower energy prices for consumers 
and transitioning to low-carbon economies (European Commission 2018(b))." 
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3.3. Environmental Sustainability 
Firstly considering, that through natural gas policy and diversification, EU pursues 
towards its climate goals as a long-term measure. Therefore firstly energy mix of the EU 
based on consumption will be looked with EU gas production, also CO2 trends and 
forecasts by IEA will be considered and finally Azerbaijan’s role in relation with EU 
sustainability goals through energy security. 
 
3.3.1. EU energy consumption mix 
The long-term energy policy is firstly to cut emission through Energy Roadmaps 
2020,2030,2050 by 80-95% from this century (European Commission 2010:2-3). This 
means the growing importance on environmentally friendly fuels, firstly renewables as 
wind, solar, hydro-energy, but additionally nuclear heat and gas are also considered. Since 
the natural gas is seen as a bridge towards renewables due to its properties, lower CO2 
separation than oil and even in case of renewables, then natural gas is easy to manage, 
when there is lack of sun or wind to compensate cost-effectively heat generation instead 
doing it with electricity (IEA 2018:172).  
Based on European Environmental Agency (EEA), then still petroleum products oil and 
gasoline have the highest share of consumption energy mix 32%, since it has been the 
main commodity since 20th century and now the shift towards new energy resources is 
occurring (EEA).  
 
Figure 7. Primary energy consumption by fuel 2016 EU28. European Environmental 
Agency12 
                                                 
12 European Environment Agency. EU consumption mix by fuel. Retrieved 05.02.2019 
https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/primary-energy-consumption-by-fuel-6/assessment-
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While nuclear and renewables pose together 28%, then firstly the aim is increase 
renewables and decrease coal consumption with oil. Firstly promoting gas serves the 
purpose to decrease oil share. IEA energy forecast for natural gas trend is that by 2030 it 
will become second-largest source of energy after oil in the world, which on EU level 
already has happened. The gas consumption in New Policy scenario tends to be 45% 
higher than it is now in 2040 and China will import as much gas as does it EU region as 
total (IEA 2018:171). 
 
Greenhouse gas emission 
The overlook shows of CO2 emission, as most primary indicator of greenhouse gases 
emission, that since 2014 CO2 emission has slightly risen (BP Statistics). It can be due to 
cheap global oil prices and gas prices, but it is an alarming signal for the EU, if they want 
to continue their goals to decrease emission.  
 
Figure 8. CO2 per capita in EU. British petroleum13 
The IEA sustainability goal in 2040 is to have CO2 index per capita decreasing and around 
two, but based on IEA New policy scenario, it seems complicated. Firstly, the predicted 
energy demand is growing faster by 2040, then EU assumed. While now in EU, index is 
                                                 
 
13 Data derived from British petroleum Statistics. CO2 per capita in EU. Retrieved 31.12.2018 
https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/energy-charting-tool-desktop.html 
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6.94 co2/per capita, then based on new policy scenario, it will be close to four, not two as 
predicted before (IEA 2018:117).  
 
3.3.2. EU long term forecast 
The role of natural gas as key issue on EU sustainability, then firstly production and 
consumption must be looked at. Since 2008 natural gas production in EU has 
continuously decreased while since 2014 is shows growing trends (British Petroleum 
Statistics). One of the main reasons is that EU states are restricting natural gas production 
or reserves are depleting. Based on IEA, then decision from major intra-EU producer 
Netherlands to restrict production from Groningen fields leads to a major decline in 
production and from current 25bcm/y will be reduced to zero by 2030. Netherlands 
scenario indicates, that they will be able to produce about 10bcm/y in 2040 (IEA 
2018:181). The scenario presented by IEA sees drastic fall in production for EU. In 2025 
EU produces 65bcm/y, 2030 49bcm/y and 2040 only 45bcm/y (IEA 2018:179). The 
drastic fall leads to increasing import need from outside the European Union. Considering 
the demand for import, which in 2017 was 73% of natural gas total consumption, then on 
EU, IEA scenario predicts imports to be 409bcm in 2025, which is 86% of its 
consumption and in 2040, imports 373bcm share 89% of total demand (IEA 2018:182).  
 
Figure 9. EU Natural gas production and consumption. British Petroleum14 
                                                 
14 Data derived from British Petroleum Statistics. EU Natural gas production and consumption. Retrieved 
31.12.2018 https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/energy-charting-tool-
desktop.html 
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3.3.3. Azerbaijan and EU’s sustainability 
Azerbaijan, who serves a role of supplier of natural gas for EU pursuing security and 
climate goals, then increasing potential importance to cooperate with EU, gas potential 
must be considered. While both understand the importance of climate change, which EU 
promotes through market regulations and Eastern Partnership Program, then gas as a 
physical matter to EU is most important. 
Considering previous forecasts on growing share of extra-EU import, then Azerbaijan can 
help it two ways. Firstly, providing gas themselves and secondly adding Turkmenistan in 
future to the supply chain of gas. IEA forecast to Azerbaijan a rapid growth of production. 
In 2017 Azerbaijan produced 18bcm, but by 2025 it is predicted to be 32bcm/y. 
Afterwards production will be increased 39bcm by 2030, 44bcm by 2035 and finally 
46bcm in 2040 scenario (IEA 2018:179). Considering the domestic demand previously 
discussed, then Azerbaijan is clearly motivated towards EU market with potential of 
supplying Turkey with extra exports when needed in future. The share of EU’s import 
may be in positive scenario about 5-8%, when Azerbaijan will be capable to export about 
25-30bcm. 
Secondly, the pipeline system is set place between Azerbaijan and EU through Southern 
Gas Corridor can link other potential suppliers as Turkmenistan. IEA gives an estimate, 
that from 2017-2040 Turkmenistan’s production annually rise from 80bcm to 154bcm/y 
(IEA 2018:179). Also, Iran can be considered to supply EU in future, when political 
situation is suitable. Between 2017-2040 Iran is estimated to expand it’s production 
volume from 214bcm to 315bcm/y (IEA 2018:179). Considering, that due to Azerbaijan’s 
lower resources than Iran and Turkmenistan (also other possible Middle East states to 
export gas to EU), then in long perspective Azerbaijan would win from that. Since their 
R/P is decreasing and new field discoveries depend on further exploration, then 
Azerbaijan as a major shareholder in Southern Gas Corridor pipelines would earn 
forwards transit rent fee, even when it’s EU export may decrease. It can be seen a long 
term strategical plan for Azerbaijan’s future and also same plan for EU having extra gas. 
 
Concluding remarks on sustainability dimension 
The sustainability dimension seems to be most important considering energy security. 
The future decrease of production and increasing import dependence of natural gas makes 
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them extra actively to look diversification opportunities and not to be more dependent on 
Russia’s natural gas reserves. Also considering Azerbaijan’s role and cooperation, then 
in long term sustainability situation, where EU needs resources, both will benefit. One of 
the reasons is that gas share in energy mix will increase and Azerbaijan’s production 
volumes are growing. This also serves the reducing risk of conflict purpose in liberal 
thought, because through trustable supply on market, the possibility for gas supply 
disruptions will stay low. 
Hence considering CO2 level increase in the EU, then it seems, that economic needs and 
aims overcome climate change goals, but based on this time period, no certain conclusions 
cannot be made because gas share is mix will increase and ideally it will bring down 
emission level. Based on IPE liberal approach, then in case of EU, European Commission 
as supranational institution coordinate member states actions in energy sector to cut down 
emissions through sustainability dimension in their energy triangle. Additionally, 
promoting new suppliers on energy market can be also somehow seen an emergency 
response to deal future energy market shocks, to continue its security and climate goals. 
Still the potentials base on IEA forecasts on models based on current situation. 
Considering all that, then future relationship between Azerbaijan and EU is likely to be 
more interdependent and stronger firstly to fulfil climate goals through new natural gas 
supplies and also. 
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3.4. Assessment of Azerbaijan’s fit to EU energy security framework 
Considering the neoliberal assumption, in the case of EU there is no hierarchy in policy 
issues, whereas military would dominate in neorealist assumption. When considering 
energy security, natural gas diversification through new suppliers would dictate the future 
EU aims in energy cooperation in order to have sufficient supply on the gas market. This 
would mean bilateral relationship between EU and Azerbaijan to keep Southern Gas 
Corridor supply chain reliable and pursue their policies, that would not cause any tensions 
to transit states or vice versa. Additionally, it is especially important for EU since it 
becomes a potential for new suppliers in the future from gas rich regions. 
Considering the theoretical framework of neoliberalism, explained by IPE liberal 
approach shows the complexity of issues EU faces. While the gas is considered a 
commodity, the EU liberal approach on market liberalization has led to take extra steps 
to have new sources of supply and to decrease the role of Russia’s gas. The positive 
attribute of IPE liberal approach is that it helps to explain EU energy triangle through 
different aspects and economic/environmental goals are considered, which allows us to 
look closer at three energy security dimensions towards Azerbaijan. 
Therefore, based on three dimensions, this thesis tried to answer the research question 
“How would Azerbaijan’s natural gas fit in to the EU long-term energy security 
framework?” and assess it as it “fits perfectly”, “fits partially”, “does not fit” or “fits good 
enough but other factors might be involved”. 
Considering EU energy triangle topics in relevance to Shaffer’s components of energy 
security, findings through energy security indicators and relevant matters affecting 
potential gas supply, this thesis finds that Azerbaijan fits into the framework good enough, 
but other factors may be involved. All dimensions fit with EU energy security goals and 
to framework but not perfect considering IPE liberal application, of how the potential 
energy trade helps to lower the conflict and is beneficial to all.  
The reliability dimension firstly indicates, that natural gas supplies are available in 
sufficient volumes and serves EU diversification aim. On the other hand, Azerbaijan is 
influenced by Russia and Georgia, because the growing domestic consumption has made 
them import gas from Russia and Gazprom and having a share of their market, which 
makes them more dependent on Russia. Georgia as transit state benefits from gas 
transportation and has positive relations with EU and Azerbaijan, but due to occupied 
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areas, the potential escalation can affect gas supply to EU. This also applies to Armenia-
Azerbaijan confrontation on Nagorno-Karabakh area. 
Considering Turkey, who wants to become a giant gas hub, the growing demand may 
affect future possible supplies to EU. Yet, considering Trans Adriatic Pipeline, the 
Azerbaijan government, SOCAR and STEAS have a majority of the pipeline, 58%. It 
gives them a majority and they can do favoring decisions upon transport, which makes 
EU-Azerbaijan positive relations more important. 
Considering all that on reliability, perfect non-interrupted gas supply scenario cannot be 
achieved, because they are assumed to be reliable partners due to their wish to sell their 
resources to EU, but Russia’s factor is high in the region, and it must be taken in account 
considering also occupied and disputed areas. 
The affordability dimension in the case of Azerbaijan’s gas highly depends on oil prices 
and the seabed gas from Shah Deniz makes production costs a bit higher. Therefore low 
gas prices would not serve their profitable outlooks and would make them try to keep gas 
price possibly high. From the EU perspective, it serves their purpose to have gas supplier 
on market from which competition will rise and ideally make it cheaper for consumers as 
IPE liberal approach assumes as well. Also, currently there is no trade between EU and 
Azerbaijan, but considering their export prices on gas, they are not as volatile as EU has 
been which show the stability from producer.  
Considering the affordability, it fits perfectly to EU energy security perspective to have 
gas on an affordable price to mainly Gazprom dominated markets in Southern Eastern 
Europe. But with Azerbaijan, it still mostly depends on global oil prices and no guarantee 
can be given on future prices. So, considering growing gas consumption trend in EU and 
World Bank forecast on growing gas prices, then cooperation between EU and Azerbaijan 
natural gas trade is likely to grow. 
The sustainability dimension is firstly based on the EU’s goal to change its energy mix 
towards renewables, but gas is seen as a bridge to move towards more environmentally 
friendly consumption, which is one of the policies of European Commission to deal with 
climate change and avoid future market shocks. Yet, there are other reasons, such as 
decreasing production and increasing dependency on natural gas import, which makes 
EU especially important for diversifying suppliers. While EU natural gas reserves are 
depleting and production decreases, in the IEA policy scenario, by 2040 it has fallen 
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almost three times to 45bcm/y while it consumes about 373bcm/y. Also, when we 
consider Britain leaving the EU, then production in the union would presumably be 
smaller. 
Considering sustainability, Azerbaijan fits perfectly to EU energy security framework to 
continue low-carbon goals in long term. Azerbaijan’s production will grow almost three 
times to 46bcm/y by 2040 in IEA policy scenarios and considering Southern Gas Corridor 
expansion capabilities, then supposedly it will continue export to the EU market. 
Considering EU’s demands and Azerbaijan’s potential output, in a positive scenario, 
Azerbaijan’s gas share in EU market can reach up to 5-8% by 2040, which means, that 
pipeline exporters share in total will change. 
Considering three dimensions, the hypothesis based on theory “through pursuing energy 
cooperation with Azerbaijan, European Union will benefit on long-term energy security” 
concludes, that EU will benefit on long-term energy security. As Southern Gas Corridor 
is promoted by Azerbaijan and EU, it is one of a kind by length and holds a potential in 
future for EU. Both Azerbaijan and EU benefit from the project, but it serves EU energy 
security goals to have more potential supplies like Turkmenistan’s gas or maybe Middle-
Eastern gas, but still the political situation and security of supply will be the main factors. 
While the gas consumption will grow in the world, EU must continue increasing its 
suppliers amount who would trade and compete in single market, to fulfill their demand 
and Southern Gas Corridor as an example can encourage future projects. 
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Summary 
The aim of this thesis was to evaluate how Azerbaijan fits in to the EU energy security 
framework through three energy security dimensions: reliability, affordability and 
environmental sustainability. The theoretical framework laid down to examine 
cooperation in energy security based on neoliberalism. Neoliberalism was chosen because 
of various problems that EU energy strategy needs to cope with and neoliberalism 
application on energy through IPE liberal approach helped to understand cooperation 
between EU and Azerbaijan. Firstly, both sides will benefit from gas trade and through 
diversification EU can have more supply on single energy market and it hypothetically 
slightly decreases Russia’s influence in Southern Eastern Europe. 
The research question “how would Azerbaijan fit to the EU long-term energy security 
framework?” as an exploratory single case study was approached through concept of 
energy security. The exploratory single case study was chosen, because there is no gas 
trade between EU-Azerbaijan as of 2019 and it takes into account forecasts and potentials 
for future in relation to EU energy security goals. Finally, the fuzzy energy security 
concept does not have a common approach on analysis and it is context dependent.  
Shaffer’s three components on analyzing energy security, reliability, affordability, 
environmental sustainability, reflected EU energy triangle main objectives and IEA goals 
for sustainable energy development. The simple indicators added to analysis reflect the 
basic components of evaluating energy security. The main data relied on British 
Petroleum Statistics as proven natural gas reserves, consumption, prices, trade and CO2 
per capita indicator. Yet, other statistics by various organizations can have different data, 
for example dissimilar proven reserves amount, but BP has long history in Azerbaijan 
and it’s information is widely used for analyses. Eurostat and European Environmental 
Agency and Azerbaijan’s Statistics were also used for energy mix information and for 
Azerbaijan’s export and income on natural gas. Forecasts based mostly on IEA outlook 
scenarios and secondly on World Bank future gas price predictions.  
This thesis claimed, that Azerbaijan would fit good enough, but other factors are involved. 
In case of reliability dimension, Azerbaijan as potential diversification state suited well 
with physical gas supplies and resources to production ratio considering long-term 
relationship. The supply chain in case of transit states and potential influencers showed, 
that Russia has still a high influence in the region and Azerbaijan imports gas from it to 
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supply domestic consumption. Furthermore, Georgia has territories occupied, which can 
be used as Russia’s interest to destabilize the state. The same applies to Azerbaijan in the 
context of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Therefore full reliability in terms of security of 
supply cannot be achieved due to complicated political situation in the region.  
For EU, Azerbaijan’s gas will be affordable, when oil prices are low and hypothetically 
could fit supplying for the increasing EU gas consumption on single market. Azerbaijan’s 
gas production on the other hand is more expensive, because they produce it from a deep 
seabed in the Caspian Sea. Therefore, higher gas prices are preferred by Azerbaijan and 
World Bank forecast predicted a growing gas price for the next decade. Additionally, 
previous gas export prices were not as volatile as were EU market prices in relation with 
oil prices. Considering all that, it fits to affordability dimension and Southern-Eastern 
Europe gas market will be more diversified, where Gazprom has high share of imports.  
In sustainability dimension, the fit was seen. Due to decreasing production of natural gas 
due depleting resources, EU’s import dependence will grow around 90% of total 
consumption. Additionally, when the aim is to decrease greenhouse emission, the 
previous years up to 2017 have shown slight increase on CO2 per capita indicator. To 
continue gas promotion in energy mix towards environmental goals in EU, EU needs to 
cooperate with new suppliers in terms of fulfilling its climate goals. Azerbaijan was seen 
as a potential for sustainability, because based on 2017, their production will increase 
almost three times to 46bcm/y by 2040, while EU production falls almost three times to 
45bcm/y based on IEA scenario. 
Based on these three dimensions, the hypothesis “through pursuing energy cooperation 
with Azerbaijan, European Union will benefit on long-term energy security” is accurate. 
Both will benefit in energy security cooperation through trade as IPE liberal approach 
assumes. Azerbaijan can sell its gas and EU can achieve its energy security goals through 
Caspian Gas. 
In conclusion, this thesis tried to fit Azerbaijan into EU energy framework through three 
dimensions, while there is no gas trade and is only a prospective potential outlook for the 
future. One thing can be said for sure, that through Southern Gas Corridor, new future 
potential supplies to EU can be thought of, like Turkmenistan and Middle-East states.  
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